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Government is the people's business, and every man, woman and child becomes a
shareholder with the first penny of tax paid.1
In France in the 1980s, the socialists took over the banks. In the United States in the
2000s, the banks took over the government.2
1. INTRODUCTION
The world is still reeling from the aftershocks of the recent financial crisis. What
started as a bursting U.S. real estate bubble in mid-2007 escalated into a full-blown
systemic meltdown in global financial markets in 2008-09, followed by crippling
recession and sovereign debt crisis in the world's leading economies in 2010-11.3 The
crisis demonstrated that, in today's complex and interconnected world, the process of
financial innovation is not a matter of concern solely to financial market professionals.
Risks generated by private market actors in pursuit of financial gain have serious and
wide-ranging public implications. The ultimate cost of financial crises is inevitably borne
by the taxpayers and the broader society, especially its least affluent members. In this
context, making the financial system safer is increasingly a matter of direct public
concern, which implicates democratic politics as much as technocratic administration.
1. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address as the Governor of California (Jan. 5, 1967), available at
http://governors.1ibrary.ca.gov/addresses/33-Reagan0l.html.
2. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Ten Principles for Black Swan-Proof World, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d5aa24e-23a4-1 Ide-996a-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlkcD801zk.
3. On August 5, 2011, for the first time in 70 years, Standard & Poor's downgraded long-term debt of
the United States from AAA to AA+, with a negative outlook. See Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips
US. of Top Credit Rating, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424053111903366
504576490841235575386.html. The downgrade of U.S. debt further exacerbated the ongoing European
sovereign debt crisis threatening the viability of the Euro zone. See Steven Erlanger, With Prospect of U.S.
Slowdown, Europe Fears a Worsening Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/08/business/global/with-prospect-of-new-us-slowdown-europe-fears-worsening-debt-crisis.html?page
wanted=l&r-1.
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Theoretically, protecting the public from potentially devastating financial crises is
the job of government agencies regulating and supervising the financial services sector.
As the latest crisis demonstrated, financial regulators consistently failed to exercise truly
public-minded and independent judgment with respect to potential systemic risks created
by unfettered financial innovation and the industry's pursuit of private profit. In response
to the crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), the most sweeping financial regulation reform
legislation since the Great Depression. 4 Yet, this voluminous new law falls short of
correcting a critical flaw in the existing regulatory process: pervasive regulatory capture
and lack of consistent representation of the public interest in long-term financial stability.
Today, much like in the pre-crisis years, most substantive decisions in the area of
systemic risk regulation are made behind closed doors, by industry insiders and agency
technocrats. Is it possible to ensure meaningful public participation in the process of
regulating systemic risk associated with financial innovation? Or should we continue
relying on bankers and bureaucrats as the only viable guardians of the common good?
This is the fundamental dilemma that this Article seeks to address.
This Article challenges the underlying concept of financial sector regulation as a
process involving only two principals: the financial services industry and the government
agencies overseeing it. This Article offers a new vision of systemic risk regulation as a
tripartite process. It argues that, in order to adequately protect the public interest in
systemic stability, it is necessary to include a designated public interest representative as
an equal third party in the regulatory process. In academic literature, tripartism is
commonly understood as a mechanism empowering specific public interest groups to
participate in regulatory decision-making. 5 Despite the existence of various consumer
advocacy groups, there are currently no well-established and influential organized public
interest groups specifically targeting systemic risk issues in the financial sector that are
capable of effectively fulfilling that function. Given the absence of "natural" candidates
for this role, this Article advocates the statutory creation of a functional equivalent to
such a public interest group: the Public Interest Council (Council).
The proposed Council would have a special status as an independent government
instrumentality created by Congress and located outside of the legislative and executive
branches. 6 Its explicit charge would be to protect the interests of U.S. taxpayers in
preserving financial stability and minimizing potential systemic risk in the financial
markets. The Council would comprise individuals who are independent from both the
industry and regulators, and who are competent in issues of financial regulation-
primarily academic experts, but also certain public figures (not holding any official post)
and representatives of consumer and other public interest groups. Although the Council
would not have any legislative or executive powers, it would have broad statutory
authority to collect any information it deems necessary from any government agency or
private market participant and to conduct targeted investigations and reviews of specific
issues and trends in financial markets. The Council's statutory powers would also include
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
5. See infra Part IlIl.A.
6. As explained below, the proposed Council's special status is designed to be similar to that of certain
congressional advisory and investigatory commissions. See infra Part V.A.
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the right to request regulatory agencies to report on their activities or to take action in
identified areas, to participate in regulatory rule-making, and to petition Congress to take
action with respect to specific issues of public concern. In effect, the Council's main
functions would be to impose structural checks on regulatory capture and to diffuse the
industry's power to control the regulatory agenda by putting both financial regulators and
financial institutions under constant and intense public scrutiny.7 In that sense, the
proposed Council may be viewed as a permanent equivalent of a congressional advisory
commission whose task is to shine the disinfecting sunlight on the workings of the
financial services industry and its official overseers before the disaster strikes.8
The creation of the Council as a new form of tripartism in financial sector regulation
would embody a radically novel approach to systemic risk containment. Unavoidably,
this proposal raises many difficult questions and is likely to invite numerous and well-
justified criticisms, especially from the perspective of political feasibility and practical
implementation. This Article does not claim to answer all of these questions. It outlines
the broad contours of the new system and leaves many important details to be filled in
later. In that respect, this is very much a thought experiment. The purpose of the Article
is not to develop a comprehensive, adoption-ready legislative proposal. Rather, its goal is
to frame the inquiry into how to design a more explicitly public-minded system of
financial sector regulation. By envisioning a fundamentally new form of regulatory
process, however incomplete or difficult to implement, this Article takes an important
step in that direction.
The Article is structured as follows. Part II defines the fundamental regulatory
dilemma in the financial sector regulation after the crisis as the need to incorporate
broader societal interests directly into the regulatory process. This argument serves as a
normative justification for introducing the concept of tripartism in the financial sector
regulation. Part III briefly examines the notions of tripartism and public interest
representation in academic debate. Part IV analyzes the elements of tripartism and
tripartite arrangements that currently exist in various regulatory contexts and discusses
their potential applicability in systemic risk regulation in the financial sector. Part V
outlines the principal framework for the design and operation of the proposed Council,
including its key functions and powers, the process and criteria for the appointment and
removal of its members, and methods of ensuring the Council's independence and
7. It is important to note that the Council's unique mission and status distinguish it from two new
regulatory agencies created by the Dodd-Frank Act: the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB). The FSOC is an interagency body charged with identifying
and monitoring systemic risk in the financial sector. See Dodd-Frank § I11 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321)
(establishing the FSOC). Its role is to provide a unifying regulatory perspective on systemic risk rather than to
act as an independent third party at the table. CFPB focuses on protecting individual consumers of financial
services from fraud and unfair treatment by financial market professionals. See id. tit. X (to be codified at
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the CFPB). While consumer protection is an important matter of
public interest, it is substantively different from systemic risk regulation. Thus, CFPB's jurisdiction and
regulatory competence limit its potential to perform the role of the proposed Council.
8. As Justice Brandeis once famously said about the critical role of publicity in financial regulation,
"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.... That potent force must, in the impending struggle,
be utilized in many ways as a continuous remedial measure." Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933).
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accountability. It also examines potential challenges to and criticisms of the proposed
tripartite model of systemic risk regulation in financial markets.
II. REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
A. Financial Regulation Reform After the Crisis: Systemic Risk and Regulatory Capture
The recent global financial crisis exposed numerous faults in the pre-crisis paradigm
of financial sector regulation. A search for the causes of the crisis is far from over, as
scholars, policy-makers, and various specially-appointed commissions continue trying to
discern general patterns and key break points in a complex maze of factors and events.9
Greed, recklessness, deception, arrogance, and ignorance-all of these human failings
played an important role in the latest crisis. 10 But there were also deeper structural
problems that caused this systemic failure in the financial market. I1
1. Systemic Risk Regulation
In many ways, the recent crisis was the first truly systemic financial crisis. 12 In the
pre-crisis era, the complexity and interconnectedness of financial markets and
institutions, driven by technological progress and innovation, far outpaced regulatory
developments. To a great extent, the crisis was attributable to the regulatory agencies'
failure to prevent the excess accumulation of risk and leverage in the financial system.13
In part, this was a result of the sheer scope and speed of the changes in the market, which
made it inherently difficult to detect and measure systemic risk. 14 The availability of
9. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf (analyzing the causes of the crisis); U.S. SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011) [hereinafter THE LEVIN REPORT], available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
files/Financial Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf (setting forth the results of the congressional investigation into
the causes of the crisis); FIN. SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tumerreview.pdf (evaluating the
international and domestic sources of systemic risk).
10. See, e.g., THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note 9 (providing detailed case studies of various breaches of
duties and other misconduct by private and public actors).
I1. For a classic exposition of the dynamics of a financial crisis, see CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER &
ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005).
12. See Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century. Some Observations on the "Big-
Picture" Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 158 (2009)
(characterizing the recent crisis as "the first genuinely global" and "clearly systemic in nature").
13. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 9, at xvii-xx (concluding that the failure of regulatory
oversight was one of the key causes of the crisis).
14. There are many definitions of systemic risk. As Professor Adam Levitin noted, "The term systemic
risk is not a term of art with a precise, generally accepted definition." Adam Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99
GEO. L.J. 435, 443 (2011). Thus, according to one definition, systemic risk is the risk "of widespread failures of
financial institutions or freezing up of capital markets that can substantially reduce the supply of capital to the
real economy." Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in A BIRD'S EYE VIEW, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS OF 2007-2009: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1 (2009). Another popular definition refers to systemic risk as
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic
or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant
2012] 625
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high-speed computing power coupled with the developments in theoretical finance
allowed financial institutions to create new financial products whose value could only be
established through the use of sophisticated proprietary-mathematical models. 15 These
products, frequently structured as over-the-counter derivative contracts, 16 were widely
used for the purposes of regulatory arbitrage, over-leveraging, and high-volume
speculation.17 The markets for trading such products, and the financial institutions
actively participating in these markets, grew in size and importance and became more
complex, dynamic, and opaque.18 This ever-increasing complexity effectively put many
financial products beyond the reach of transparency and governability. 19 Despite the
recent advances in technologies of compliance and risk management, 20 neither the
financial institutions nor their regulators were able to understand the dynamics of
systemic-risk accumulation. 2 1
The spread of economic woes around the globe, triggered by the bursting of the
subprime-mortgage bubble in the United States in 2007, clearly illustrates potentially
devastating consequences of a glitch in a seemingly insulated segment of the financial
market on the economic, social, and political stability and welfare of millions of people
who have no direct connection to such a market. 22 Government bailouts of troubled
financial institutions, whose risky business activities were at the heart of the crisis,
imposed unprecedented costs on taxpayers in the United States and other countries.2 3 The
true costs of the crisis, however, go far beyond the amounts disbursed directly through
official bailout programs. 24 Widespread failures of small and mid-size businesses in the
losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-marketplace volatility.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
15. For a thoughtful analysis of this phenomenon, see Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source:
The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV.
127 (2009).
16. Derivatives are financial instruments whose value is "derived" from the value of another asset,
referred to as the underlying or reference asset. Over-the-counter derivatives are bilateral contracts that are not
traded on exchanges. Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the
Promise ofRegulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-65 (1993).
17. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 9, at xxiv-xxv (concluding that derivatives
significantly contributed to the crisis).
18. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211
(2009) (discussing the dynamics and effects of the growing complexity in financial markets).
19. See id. at 216-36 (examining how complexity impairs markets actors' ability to understand and
measure risk in financial system).
20. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital
Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (examining the use of modem technologies for regulatory compliance
purposes).
21. There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on the sources and dynamics of systemic risk in the
financial market. See supra note 14. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is assumed that systemic risk
remains the key, widely acknowledged but poorly understood, feature of today's global financial market.
22. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles, and the Distribution of
Income, 30 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2010) (arguing that financial innovation created a high level of
leverage in the financial system and exposed the broader economy and society to too much risk).
23. Thus, in the United States, Congress authorized $700 billion in the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
24. Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 149, 159
626 [Vol. 37:3
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post-crisis economic recession, historically high levels of long-term unemployment,
public budget cuts, and loss of funding for numerous social programs are an integral part
of the overall cost of the financial crisis to society. 25 Thus, financial crises directly
implicate virtually every area of public concern, including housing, education, health
care, labor markets, and environmental protection. 26 This increasingly visible public
dimension of systemic risk in the financial market creates a fundamental tension within
the existing system of financial regulation, traditionally not equipped to deal directly with
such broad societal interests.2 7 While spectacular financial sector gains remained
privatized, equally spectacular losses were effectively socialized.2 8
Unfortunately, post-crisis regulatory reforms failed to provide a satisfactory solution
to this deep-seated problem. The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to achieve its ambitious goal of
containing systemic risk in the financial sector through a wide range of measures. 29 The
Act established a new regulatory agency, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), specifically charged with the task of monitoring and regulating systemic risk
throughout the entire U.S. financial sector. 30 The FSOC's activities are to be supported
by the new Office of Financial Research (OFR) in the U.S. Treasury Department, which,
among other things, will focus on detecting and analyzing potential systemic risk
concerns in financial markets. 3 1 The FSOC has the power to identify systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) that would be subject to regulatory oversight by
(2010) ("A simple tally of dollars authorized or disbursed, of course, is wholly inadequate to accurately assess
the ultimate taxpayer cost of government bailouts.").
25. It is particularly disturbing that the poorest members of society are bearing the brunt of the post-crisis
recession. See, e.g., Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Community Development in Challenging
Times, Address at the Federal Reserve Community Affairs Research Conference (Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20l10429a.htm (stating that poor communities and
individuals have been hit the hardest by the economic problems in the aftermath of the financial crisis).
26. Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Society, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 505, 528-33 (2011) (arguing
that financial crises impact all areas of economic and social life).
27. In fact, the primary goal of the U.S. system of bank regulation and supervision is to ensure solvency
of banking organizations and to protect the banking industry from failure. For an overview of the U.S. banking
regulation, see RICHARD ScoTr CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed.
2009); LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES
(2011).
28. See, e.g., Taleb, supra note 2 ("We have managed to combine the worst of capitalism and
socialism."); Nouriel Roubini, Is Purchasing $700 billion of Toxic Assets the Best Way to Recapitalize the
Financial System? No! It is Rather a Disgrace and Rip-Off Benefitting only the Shareholders and Unsecured
Creditors of Banks, ECONOMONITOR (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.economonitor.com/nouriel/2008/09/
28/is-purchasing-700-billion-of-toxic-assets-the-best-way-to-recapitalize-the-financial-system-no-it-is-rather-a-
disgrace-and-rip-off-benefitting-only-the-shareholders-and-unsecured-creditors-of-banks/ ("This is again a case
of privatizing the gains and socializing the losses; a bailout and socialism for the rich, the well-connected and
Wall Street.").
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
30. Id. § Ill (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321) (establishing the FSOC). The voting members of the
FSOC, headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, include primarily the heads of the key financial regulatory
agencies, such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Id.
31. Id. § 152 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342) (establishing the OFR).
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the Federal Reserve. 32 In addition, the voluminous new legislation contains provisions
dealing with derivatives trading and clearing, 33 resolution of failing SIFIs,34 consumer
protection,35 and many other issues related to financial stability and systemic risk
prevention.
It is far from clear how successful the Dodd-Frank Act will be in taming systemic
risk in practice. In essence, the Act takes a technocratic approach to systemic risk
prevention, to be achieved through imposing enhanced prudential requirements on certain
financial institutions, mandating greater data disclosure, and rationalizing market
infrastructure. Ultimately, most of its solutions seek to shape entity-level incentives to
reduce or better manage risks, mainly by expanding the scope and availability of
information and by rendering certain risks more costly for individual firms to undertake
or keep on their books. However, the act of balancing the costs of a risky asset or activity
(including the cost of acquiring and processing relevant information) versus its potential
returns at the individual entity level is fundamentally different from the same balancing
act at the systemic level. What may be an acceptable level of risk for a firm, acting as a
rational decision-maker, may nevertheless contribute to unacceptably high levels of
systemic risk.36
There are many explanations for this mismatch. The complexity of the markets and
products significantly inhibits any individual firm's ability to gauge accurately the
broader systemic effects of its actions. 37 Various behavioral biases further increase the
chances of a presumably rational actor making seemingly "irrational" choices.38 Finally,
as private profit-seeking enterprises, firms act in a self-regarding manner in assessing and
taking risks. They do not internalize the spillover effects of such selfish risk-taking,
which are particularly dangerous in the context of increasing interconnectivity in today's
financial markets.39 This interplay of conflicting incentives explains why market forces,
without regulatory intervention, are not capable of solving the fundamental tension
between private and public costs of risk-taking in the financial sector.40
32. Id. § 113 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
33. See Dodd-Frank tit. VII (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
34. See id. tit. II (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the process for orderly
liquidation of financial institutions).
35. See id. tit. X (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing and describing regulatory
powers and duties of the CFPB).
36. See, e.g., Brian J. M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 549 (2009) (exploring the causes of the financial crisis and proposing public policy
changes).
37. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011) (discussing the origins and potential methods of managing
systemic risk).
38. Scholars in behavioral finance offer sophisticated theoretical accounts of such biases, or heuristic
devices, commonly used by market actors as short cuts for their decision making. See ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS (2008).
39. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 37, at 1375-77.
40. As some commentators have argued, this "tragedy of commons suggests that, absent intervention,
financial market participants will progressively pursue their self-interest in the form of socially excessive risk-
taking." Id. at 1375.
628 [Vol. 37:3
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The enacted reforms, despite their undeniable importance, fall short of a
paradigmatic shift necessary to resolve that dilemma. As the crisis demonstrated,
effective monitoring and control of systemic risk in today's complex and dynamic global
financial market require an approach that is more assertive and comprehensive, as well as
self-reflective. 4 1 To put it simply, there seems to be too much undetected, unmeasured,
and misunderstood risk in the financial system, which is not likely to be effectively
internalized by private market actors. Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act conspicuously fails to
frame the core issues in terms of imposing explicit front-end limits on the creation of
excess risk in the financial system. Most of the Act's provisions continue to "rely on the
old, pre-crisis, regulatory principles and assumptions." 42 The new legislation does not
disturb the existing public-private balance in financial regulation and does not articulate
a principle for defining how much risk in the financial system is too much to bear for the
society as a whole. 43 Without addressing this fundamentally political issue, it will not be
possible to solve the problem of containing systemic risk and ensuring long-term
financial, economic, and social stability.44
2. The Problem ofRegulatory Capture
In large part, the latest crisis was also attributable to the regulators' failure to
maintain their independence from the financial industry and to act in a truly public
minded manner-the phenomena commonly associated with the concept of regulatory
capture. Regulatory capture is one of the most widely accepted concepts in the studies of
politics, regulation, and administrative law.4 5 The original theory focused on the capture
of legislators by private interest groups, which used their economic resources to "buy"
41. See, e.g., Cristie Ford, Macro and Micro Level Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U.B.C.
L. REv. 589 (2011) (advocating a shift toward "meta-regulation" as a more iterative and reflexive regulatory
model that focuses regulators' attention on the unknown).
42. Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for A New Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 83,
86(2011).
43. Id at 94, 97.
44. Admittedly, this is a contestable proposition. Some scholars and financial industry experts do not see
the need for any fundamental paradigm changes in the current system of financial services regulation and argue
instead for a better, more efficient, or more assertive use of existing regulatory tools. See Brett McDonnell,
Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and after a Financial Crisis (Minnesota Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 11-09, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1753760
(advocating an incremental and market-friendly approach to post-crisis regulatory reform). Without a doubt, it
is necessary to exercise caution before embarking upon sweeping regulatory reforms in such an uncertain and
fast-moving area as financial services. It is also clear that, in the pre-crisis era, regulators often neglected or
misused their legal authority and regulatory tools, which might have been effective in preventing or minimizing
at least some of the trends that led to the crisis. Resolving this debate is beyond the bounds of this Article. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to state that, even acknowledging the significance of incremental reforms, it is
important to realize that there may come a point at which the market outgrows existing regulatory concepts, so
that further refinement of such concepts simply does not fill that gap.
45. Admittedly, regulatory capture remains an under-theorized and frequently over-used notion that refers
to a wide variety of conceptually distinct forms of special-interest influence in the regulatory process. For an
insightful new perspective on the study of regulatory capture, see PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOw TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., forthcoming 2012)
[hereinafter PREVENTING CAPTURE], available at http://www.tobinproject.orgfbooks-papers/preventing-capture.
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desired legal and regulatory outcomes from politicians. 46 Later versions of this public
choice theory and its intellectual offshoots offer a more nuanced view of regulatory
capture, which comes in different forms and often defies simple definitions. 4 7 Despite the
complexities and ambiguities in its normative meaning, the concept of regulatory capture
commonly denotes the misalignment of incentives of government actors who pursue
narrow private interests that may conflict with the public interest they purport to serve. 48
In the financial services sector, regulatory capture is particularly pervasive and
difficult to avoid. Certain characteristics of financial markets and institutions render
regulatory and supervisory agencies overseeing them inherently susceptible to capture.4 9
The financial services industry is well-organized, contains a number of large institutional
players, and has a great deal of economic and political power. By contrast, consumers of
financial services, especially at the retail level, are a large, widely dispersed group with
diffused interests. 50 Financial regulators routinely consult with the industry on rule-
making, and agency supervisors typically maintain close contact with the firms they
examine. 5 1 As a result, not only do the supervisors and regulators come to rely on the
industry's superior technical expertise, especially with respect to the increasingly
complex financial products and services, but they also build strong professional and
personal relationships with the managers of the regulated institutions. 5 2 The "revolving
door" phenomenon makes these ties particularly strong, as the heavily regulated financial
industry has a special interest in hiring former agency employees familiar with the inner
workings of the regulatory process. 53
Financial regulators often come to view their institutional interests or mission as
largely congruent with the interests of their regulated industry constituency. The
46. For a classic exposition of public choice theory and the concept of capture, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141-48 (1965); George Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sel. 3 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the
Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 176 (2011) (arguing that capture is often used as a rhetorical
device rather than a rigorous analytical tool).
48. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1642-44
(2011) (discussing reasons for regulators' failure to act in the public interest).
49. Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/34,
2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=892925.
50. Id. at 4.
51. This is an inevitable consequence of prudential supervision, especially with respect to large financial
institutions that often get dedicated examiner teams stationed on their premises and closely working with their
management. For an overview of the Federal Reserve's framework for supervising large financial institutions,
see FED. RESERVE Sys., FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-FOCUSED SUPERVISION OF LARGE COMPLEX INSTITUTIONS
(1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRetters/1997/sr9724al.pdf, Lisa M. DeFerrari
& David E. Palmer, Supervision ofLarge Complex Banking Organizations, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Feb.
2001, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubsbulletin/2001/02011ead.pdf.
52. As Hardy argues, "The complexity of financial systems, the need in many circumstances to maintain
confidentiality, and the normally diffuse interests of the nonfinancial sector in financial sector regulation
suggest that the institutions will exert a dominant influence." Hardy, supra note 49, at 20.
53. For an apt description of this "revolving door" phenomenon in the financial sector, see SIMON
JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL
MELTDOWN 92-100 (2010). For a detailed discussion of the "revolving door" between the SEC and the
financial industry, see Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethics Challenges with Revolving Door, PROJECT ON
GOv'T OVERSIGHT (May 13, 2011), http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/revolving-regulators-20110513.pdf.
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dynamics of regulatory arbitrage and competition in global financial markets partially
explain this phenomenon. 54 In a broader sense, however, it reflects a more subtle and
insidious form of ideological or cultural capture. 55 The famous "Greenspan doctrine,"
exalting the virtues of unfettered financial innovation as the ultimate public good, is but
one example of such ideological capture. 56
The financial industry's agenda-setting power, or the power to frame the debate on
regulation, is an important channel for maintaining its dominance and ability to shape
regulatory outcomes. 57 In the decades preceding the latest crisis, the debate on financial
sector regulation was framed in terms of inevitability and desirability of innovation and
complexity in financial markets, which had to be protected from all but absolutely
necessary regulatory interference. 58 The regulators themselves largely embraced the idea
that they should avoid directly regulating financial products, leaving it to the operation of
the free market, and "to get out of the way of industry innovation." 59 This ideological
cooptation of regulators who willingly ceded control of the regulatory debate to private
industry interests effectively precluded them from identifying potential sources of
systemic instability and devising effective solutions.
60
As this experience shows, ameliorating the sinister effects of regulatory capture in
the financial sector is a critical element of successful systemic risk regulation.
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act does not directly address the issue of regulatory
capture and agencies' failure to act in a publicly minded manner. 6 1 It does little to disturb
the familiar image of financial sector regulation as a process involving the same two key
actors: the financial services industry and its regulators. In fact, Professor David Skeel
argues that the new legislation embodies an explicitly corporatist approach to financial
services regulation, under which the government forms a partnership with large financial
54. According to Hardy, "the regulatory agency in many countries has a more or less explicit mandate to
promote the development of the national financial system and the promotion of its competitiveness against other
financial centers. Such an agency is committed to formulating regulations that are advantageous to its banks."
Hardy, supra note 49, at 4-5.
55. See generally James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis (Oct. 24, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20%2OCultural
%20Capture%20and%20the%2OFinancial%20Crisis%20%2810.24.11%29.pdf (introducing and examining the
concept of "cultural capture" as a channel of improper industry influence over financial regulators); Simon
Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/
05/the-quiet-coup/7364/ (arguing that the financial industry over time successfully shaped both technical and
normative views of the regulators who came to share the industry's version of a public good).
56. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 53, at 100-18 (describing the "ideology of finance").
57. For a discussion of various forms and sources of power, including agenda-setting and normative
power exercised by private financial institutions, see Ford, supra note 41, at 604-15 (describing the dynamics
of power and influence in setting regulatory agenda). Professor Ford defines the agenda-setting power as "the
power to decide what will be discussed." Id at 610.
58. Id.at611-13.
59. Id. at 612.
60. As Professor Ford argues, "This [agenda] made it effectively impossible for regulators to act on
concerns-indeed, to legitimately have concerns-about the extraordinary growth of the over-the-counter
derivatives market. It also prohibited a more nuanced examination of varieties of innovation, incentives for
innovation, and effects of innovation." Id.
61. See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43
CREIGHTON L. REv. 993, 994 (2010) ("The Dodd-Frank Act does not sufficiently address the problem of
agency discretion generally, or the problem of an agency's discretion to forebear, in particular.").
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institutions that get powerful protections of the "too big to fail" status in exchange for
regulatory tightening in certain areas. 62 Other commentators go even further, decrying
the continuing dominance of the regulatory sphere by the "financial oligarchy" and
further entrenchment of "crony capitalism" in the aftermath of the crisis. 63
B. Reframing the Dilemma: Systemic Risk Regulation as a Political Choice
This Article argues that a truly paradigm-shifting regulatory reform ultimately has to
move beyond technocratic solutions and confront a fundamental political problem: how
to incorporate broader societal interests directly into the process of financial services
regulation, and how to counteract the powerful tendency toward regulatory capture in the
financial sector. In the aftermath of the crisis, academics and policymakers have been
actively debating reform measures aimed at reducing and controlling systemic risk in the
financial sector. Many reform proposals, formulated before and after the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act, advocate a wide array of specific measures, such as enhanced
disclosure of financial and transactional data,64 more finely-tuned regulation of non-bank
financial actors operating in the so-called shadow banking system, 65 strengthened
corporate governance and changes in executive compensation at financial firms, 66
heightened capital requirements, 67 more stringent regulation of credit rating agencies, 6 8
and breaking up financial institutions that are "too big to fail." 69
The crisis also reinvigorated scholarly debate on potential methods of reducing the
distortion of financial regulators' incentives as a result of undue influence of private
interests. 70 Most of the proposed solutions focus on regulatory agencies and offer ways to
62. DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 191 (2010).
63. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 53, at 120 (arguing that the U.S. financial elite constitutes an
oligarchy that used its economic power to gain political power). Interestingly, Ken Griffin, the founder of the
$15 billion hedge fund Citadel Investment Group, was recently quoted as saying that the Dodd-Frank Act is
"going to deeply entrench crony capitalism into the very fabric of our financial system." Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Dodd-Frank Dissenters Sound Off, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, May 9, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/05/09/dodd-frank-dissenters-sound-off/.
64. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A Problem with
Three Dimensions (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 10-40, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1649657 (advocating mandatory public disclosure of loan-level information in
securitizations).
65. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability (Harvard John M. Olin Center
for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 706, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1933890 (proposing licensing of all firms that issue money-claims).
66. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 248
(2010) (arguing that regulation of executive pay is an important element of financial regulation reform).
67. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673 (2010) (identifying heightened capital requirements as an important tool of
systemic risk regulation).
68. See, e.g., John P. Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the 'Worldwide Credit Crisis': The Limits of
Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and the Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 109,
111 (2009) (noting that enhanced regulation would be "superior to the existing regime").
69. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holderofl, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1394 (2011) (urging the government to "break up the
largest financial institutions before they become too big to fail").
70. Of course, political scientists, economists, and administrative law scholars, among others, have been
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insulate their decision-making from direct political interference by Congress or the
presidential administration, 7 1 to increase transparency of regulatory decision-making and
agency accountability, 7 2 and to strengthen the agencies' internal subject-matter expertise
by increasing compensation of agency employees and creating an elite professional
culture among them. 73 Better paid and better educated corps of elite financial regulators,
the argument goes, will be less dependent on industry expertise, less tempted by private
sector employment, and more free to act in a publicly minded manner. 74 Other proposals
envision broader structural changes in the financial services industry, such as breaking up
large financial conglomerates, which would curb the power of private institutions to exert
disproportionate influence on government decision-makers and control regulatory
process.7 5
All of these proposals contain valuable insights into important issues in financial
services regulation. 76 Nevertheless, they tend to offer only partial solutions to the
pervasive problem of minimizing systemic risk in the financial sector and making
financial services regulation less "captive" and more public interest-oriented. Most of the
proposals tend to focus on specific, clearly delineated measures, which gives them
credibility as policy recommendations, even though some of the proposed measures may
be politically controversial. On the other hand, that same discrete and narrowly targeted
character explains the inherent limitations of these proposals. Much like the currently
enacted reforms aimed at containment of systemic risk, these largely technical solutions
are likely to achieve the desired goal only if they are part of a comprehensive and
coherent overhaul of the existing regime. Any such comprehensive reform strategy,
among other things, would have to address directly the underlying issue that most reform
proposals, at best, address only implicitly: how to ensure that financial regulators
effectively balance technocratic concerns and the broader considerations of the common
good in their decision-making.
At their core, both the problem of preventing regulatory capture and the larger
actively debating how to counter regulatory capture in general for decades before the latest financial crisis, and
most theoretical development in this area took place outside the specific context of financial services regulation.
See supra note 46. For a recent example of this, see Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010).
71. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 70, at 15 (discussing mechanisms for insulating agencies from political
pressure); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L.
REv. 599, 600 (2010) (noting that political interference "undermine[s] the traditional binary division[s]").
72. Thus, one of the most heated debates in the wake of the financial crisis focused on the secretive nature
of the Federal Reserve's decision-making process and the need to mandate periodic audits of the Federal
Reserve's activities.
73. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 47, at 195 (bemoaning the difficulties the public sector encounters in
competing with the private sector for equivalently skilled employees).
74. As Steven Croley argues, agency employees generally have a genuine desire to serve the common
good and to protect the interests of the public. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 7, 29 (2000) ("[T]hose whose career paths take them to public service seem likely to be those most
committed to serving the public.").
75. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 53, at 205-22 (arguing that the right solution is not to allow
financial institutions to become and stay too big to fail).
76. This short list is by no means exhaustive of the vast array of scholarly writings and regulatory reform
proposals aimed at containing systemic risk in the financial sector. A full discussion of this literature is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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problem of minimizing systemic risk may be a matter of revisiting the basic tenets of our
regulatory philosophy and, even broader, a fundamentally political choice. 77 An effective
reform effort should seek to reinsert the concept of public interest into the structure and
process of financial sector regulation. Given the unacceptably high societal costs of
systemic financial crises and the increasing informational and power asymmetries
between the financial industry and the general public, the core issue in the reform should
be how to remedy such asymmetries. In effect, Congress has to do what it resolutely
failed to do in the Dodd-Frank Act: articulate the principle for balancing the public
interest in preserving financial stability and limiting systemic risk against the private
interests of financial market participants in pursuing economic gain.
A decision to impose principled limits on the currently unrestricted business
activities of private market participants, in the name of an inevitably vague notion of
public interest, requires a great deal of political will and courage. Yet, it may be a
necessary step toward a truly publicly minded shift in the regulatory paradigm, which the
current reforms failed to deliver. As one commentator put it, "financial market stability,
like environmental security and personal safety, is a public good that cannot be left to
market participants and their pale reflections in regulatory agencies. Since everyone is a
stakeholder, the debate must be open to all."7 8 This Article argues that one way to
revitalize the public-interest dimension of financial regulation, by opening the debate to
all stakeholders and restraining the agenda-setting power of the financial industry, is to
introduce the principle of tripartism in financial regulation. 79
III. TRIPARTISM AND GUARDIANSHIP IN ACADEMIC DEBATE
This Article uses the term "tripartism" to refer to a system designed to include
public interest representatives as direct participants in the regulatory process, along with
the regulatory agencies and the regulated industry. The idea of empowering an
independent third party to guard against the pitfalls of regulatory capture and other forms
of regulatory failure is not new in the academic debate. This Part briefly discusses some
of these scholarly approaches that offer valuable potential insights into designing an
effective tripartite system in financial sector regulation.
77. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy Over Systemic Risk Regulation, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 823,
841 (2010) ("In the final analysis, the problem of dealing with systemic risk is a political problem.").
78. Nicholas Dom, Ponzi Finance, Regulatory Capture and the Credit Crunch 21 (Mar. 19, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1365250.
79. Defining "public interest" in the area of financial services regulation is a difficult intellectual
enterprise. In general, the concept of public interest tends to be elusive and highly context-specific. See infra
notes 288-93 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of public interest). Developing a theoretical
definition of public interest in the context of financial sector regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.
Thus, for the purposes of the following discussion, the term "public interest" is used to refer to the general
public's interest in preserving financial and economic stability, minimizing the likelihood of major financial
crises occurring, and containing the potential and actual costs of such crises.
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A. Tripartism as a Counterweight to Regulatory Capture
The concept of tripartism as an element of regulatory design is commonly associated
with the model developed by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite. 80 Ayres and Braithwaite
view tripartism as an integral part of responsive regulation. They argue that "empowering
public interest groups," or PIGs, provides a solution to the problems of regulatory
capture, while allowing the government to retain the benefits of flexible and responsive
regulation built on cooperation between the regulators and the regulated industries.81 In
their model, they describe three ways tripartism can foster the participation of PIGs in the
regulatory process:
First, it grants the PIG and its members access to all the information that is
available to the regulator. Second, it gives the PIG a seat at the negotiating
table with the firm and the agency when deals are done. Third, the policy grants
the PIG the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regulatory statute as
the regulator. Tripartism means both unlocking to PIGs the smoke-filled rooms
where the real business of regulation is transacted and allowing the PIG to
operate as a private attorney general. 82
In this tripartite system, the PIGs act as the appointed guardians of the public
interest. However, recognizing that PIGs can also be captured by the industry actors,
Ayres and Braithwaite propose to make the guardianship contestable.8 3 Thus, multiple
PIGs would compete among themselves for the right to sit at the negotiating table and to
fight for the public interest that legislation intended to protect. 84
Several critical assumptions underlie Ayres and Braithwaite's argument. Most
importantly, their model of tripartism is based on an assumption that there is always an
appropriate PIG in each area of business regulation, which is in turn defined by a discrete
statutory scheme. 85 As they explain, "We assume that it is possible to identify PIGs
whose mission is the same as that embodied in a regulatory statute: environmental groups
for environmental statutes, animal welfare groups for animal welfare statutes, civil
liberties groups for privacy statutes, women's groups for affirmative action legislation,
and so on." 86
80. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 34-100 (1992).
81. Id. at 54. Ayres and Braithwaite recognize that regulatory models that foster such cooperation
between private actors and their regulators are inherently likely "to encourage the evolution of capture and
corruption." Id
82. Id. at 57-58.
83. Id. at 57.
84. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 58. This concept of contestability is one of the key
elements distinguishing Ayres and Braithwaite's theory of tripartism from models of corporatism, under which
the government essentially chooses specific groups to act as permanent third-party representatives of pre-
selected public interests in the rule-making and enforcement process. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz
Nugent, The Friendship of the People: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 269, 310-11 (2005) (describing the advantages of a corporatist model, which grants selected interest
groups a permanent seat at the table, over the concept of contestable guardianship).
85. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 59. Ayres and Braithwaite assume the existence of relevant
PIGs because they "think it unlikely that statutes that threaten the interests of business would ever have been
enacted in the absence of an interest group pushing for them." Id
86. Id. at 74.
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Ayres and Braithwaite further argue that the empowerment of PIGs through
tripartite arrangements would create incentives for formation of new PIGs, although they
admit that there may be certain regulatory areas in which this key assumption would not
hold true.87 Accordingly, there is also a strong emphasis on the enforcement of the
relevant statute by the PIGs whose interests are aligned with those of a rational (i.e., not
captured) regulator. 8
Ayres and Braithwaite explicitly state that their model of tripartism is designed as a
solution to the general problem of regulatory capture and corruption. 89 In a broader
sense, their theory is a prominent part of academic literature focusing on making
regulation more flexible and effective by "empowering stakeholders" in the regulatory
process. 90 This vast and diverse body of scholarship is theoretically and empirically rich
and offers many insights to inform the quest for reinserting public interest into financial
regulation. 9 1 However, the core assumptions underlying Ayres and Braithwaite's concept
of tripartism as an element of a more dialogic, responsive regulation potentially limit its
applicability in the context of financial sector regulation. 92 For instance, the high degree
of transactional and regulatory opacity, extreme informational and power asymmetries,
and the dynamics of market cycles explain why this pure form of PIG participation "may
not even have been a realistic possibility" in the financial regulation field.93 Moreover,
the very existence of PIGs that pursue goals explicitly relating to systemic risk prevention
in the financial services sector remains a highly questionable assumption.94
Yet, Ayres and Braithwaite's tripartism contains an important normative dimension,
which they characterize as an "application of a republican theoretical tradition to
regulation." 9 5 Civic republicanism's proponents generally advocate the ideal of a more
87. The specific example they cite is corporate tax enforcement, where there is no natural impetus for the
emergence of a PIG willing to play the enforcement game with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Id. at 59.
However, they argue that this case may be unusually difficult "because tax laws are peculiar in the way they are
brought into existence by the state to serve the needs of the state rather than in response to clamoring from
external interests." Id.
88. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 74. Although Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge that the
"front-end participation" by the PIGs in regulatory decision-making is more empowering than "back-end" right
to challenge results of corrupt decision-making in court, they view the ability to sue as the prerequisite for the
PIGs to be taken seriously at the front-end negotiating table. Id. at 77-78.
89. Id. at 54.
90. For a small sample of this multi-disciplinary body of literature, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-58 (2000); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-
Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 691
(2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy,
3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997).
91. Although it is difficult to make generalizations about this broad scholarly area, it is worth noting that
much of this literature tends to focus on empowering and securing cooperative engagement of the regulated
private actors rather than the general public. From that perspective, its direct relevance to our present inquiry
may be limited.
92. See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
93. Ford, supra note 41, at 613. According to Professor Ford, "the experience of the financial crisis
suggests that injecting a meaningfully independent perspective into regulation, by way of tripartism, may be
more challenging in practice than sometimes realized." Id at 614.
94. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
95. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 81.
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deliberative democracy and extol the virtues of enlightened public involvement in
political process. 96 Incorporating this spirit of "civic engagement" 97 into the regulatory
process may prove a timely idea in the aftermath of a major global financial crisis.
B. Grappling with Public Interest in the Debate on Financial Regulation Reform
The ongoing scholarly debate on financial regulation reform centers largely around
the issues of systemic risk prevention. To date, legal academics have not engaged directly
with the concept of tripartism. Nevertheless, certain trends within that debate move in the
same direction and call for a greater, and more direct and effective, reinsertion of public
interest in the structure and process of financial sector regulation. 98
1. Improving Governance ofFinancial Regulation
One of the most controversial proposals on that topic comes from Brown University
Professor of Economics Ross Levine. 99 In a series of recent articles, Levine argues that
one of the main causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was the systemic failure
in the governance of financial regulation, which, in turn, produced faulty "policies that
encouraged financial markets to take excessive risk and divert society's savings toward
socially unproductive ends."10 0 According to Levine, financial regulators remained aware
of potential problems accumulating in the financial markets and possessed sufficiently
robust legal powers to fix such problems, but chose not to do so, in large part due to
regulatory capture. 10 1 He criticizes current reform proposals for failing to address the
fundamental cause of this regulatory failure: the near complete exclusion of the public
from the regulatory process. 102 As Levine puts it,
There is no mechanism through which the public and its elected
representatives, possess to obtain an informed, expert, and independent
assessment of financial regulation. Therefore, the public cannot induce
regulatory institutions to act on their behalf. It does not get any more basic than
this: How can the public and its elected representatives induce regulatory
96. See, e.g., Lewis Hyde, Frames from the Framers: How America's Revolutionaries Imagined
Intellectual Property (Harvard Law Sch., Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Society, Research Publication No. 2005-
08, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=870073 (discussing the tradition of
civic republicanism in the area of intellectual property).
97. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 173-
74 (1993) (discussing communal benefits of "networks of civic engagement").
98. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 26 (arguing that greater participation of civil society groups in financial
regulation remains necessary to enhance legitimacy of regulatory institutions in global financial markets);
Caroline M. Bradley, Transparency Is The New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After The Crisis, I
AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 7 (2011) (arguing that the existing transparency mechanisms in global financial markets,
in practice, increase their opacity and contribute to the effective exclusion of the world's citizens from
meaningful participation in the financial regulation process).
99. Ross Levine, The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis I
(Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/
pdf/rl.pdf.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id at 19.
102. Id. at 2.
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authorities to behave in the best interests of the public when the regulatory
authorities have a monopoly on both the information and expertise necessary
for assessing their own performance? 1 03
Levine argues that, as a result of inherent information asymmetries and lack of
technical expertise, the general public is not capable of meaningful participation in
financial policymaking. Only the regulatory agencies "not effectively designed to act in
the public's long-run interests" possess the information and expertise necessary to
evaluate financial regulation's effectiveness. 104 To remedy this systemic governance
problem, Levine proposes to create a new kind of regulatory agency, the Financial
Regulatory Commission, which he labels the "Sentinel," to provide a continuing
informed and independent assessment of substantive financial regulation from the
viewpoint of the public interest. 05 The Sentinel is envisioned as a politically independent
agency funded from the Federal Reserve's budget and staffed with economists, lawyers,
accountants, and financial industry professionals. 106 It would possess only the power to
acquire information from other agencies necessary for evaluating financial regulation.107
Its sole responsibility would be to deliver an annual report to the legislative and executive
branches of government assessing "the current and long-run impact of financial
regulatory and supervisory rules and practices on the public."10 8 By doing so, the
Sentinel would promote transparency and informed debate on financial regulation, both
of which remain critical to effective systemic crisis prevention. 109
Levine's diagnosis of financial regulation's core weakness as the systematic,
institutionally embedded failure of regulatory agencies to act in the public interest, strikes
at the heart of the problem this Article identifies. He recognizes the fundamentally
political nature of the necessary reforms and articulates the need to "push the policy
debate toward focusing on the general welfare of the public and away from the narrow
interests of the powerful and wealthy."110 Levine's proposed solution, however, falls
short of a truly tripartite approach. He dismisses the possibility of public interest
representatives' direct inclusion in the regulatory process as the third party at the table.
Instead, under his proposal, the mission of guarding the public interest against captured
or corrupt regulatory agencies would become entrusted to yet another agency.
103. Id.
104. Levine, supra note 99, at 2.
105. Id. at 3. As Levine describes it, the Sentinel's mission would be "to act as the public's sentry over
financial policies and to help compel financial regulators to act in the public interest, regardless of their private
interests." Id.
106. Id. at 23. Levine proposes the President appoint the Sentinel's senior members, with the Senate's
advice and consent, for staggered terms, and set their salaries at market-based levels, in order to ensure the new
agency's independence and prestige. Id.
107. Levine, supra note 99, at 22. Levine emphasizes that the Sentinel would not influence the central
bank's and other regulators' powers and responsibilities; its sole mission being to shine the disinfecting light on
the secretive world of financial regulation. Id.
108. Id
109. Id. at 25. Levine does not claim that the creation of the Sentinel would, in fact, lead to complete
elimination of systemic risk, but believes that it would improve the process of financial policymaking, thus
reducing the danger of repeating regulatory failures of recent decades. Id.
110. Levine, supra note 99, at 25.
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2. Broadening Regulators'Intellectual Perspective
Regulatory agency design remains at the center of the academic debate on how to
make financial sector regulation more adaptive, effective, and also more publicly
minded.Ill Despite recognizing that financial regulators consistently failed to fulfill their
duty as the guardians of public interest in the pre-crisis era, scholars of financial
regulation continue to focus their attention on potential reforms of the existing regulatory
apparatus as the only realistic answer to the problem of capture and systemic risk
prevention. 112 An important theme in this debate is the need to enhance regulators'
intellectual and analytical capacity to detect potentially risky trends in today's
increasingly complex financial markets. Although conceptually different from the
traditional notion of regulatory capture, this phenomenon is of central importance to the
broader discussion of systemic risk.
In a recent article, Professors Geoffrey Miller and Gerald Rosenberg argue that
systemic risk regulation must aim at minimizing what they call intellectual hazard in
financial markets. 113 They define intellectual hazard as "the tendency of behavioral
biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations, thus
interfering with the acquisition, analysis, communication, and implementation of
information both within an organization and between an organization and external
parties." 1 4 The authors group these biases into three broad categories: complexity biases
that reflect actors' limited ability to analyze and interpret a complex situation, 115
incentive biases that lead actors "to see the world in accordance with their self-
interest,"1 1 6 and asymmetry biases that make actors within complex organizations favor
certain pre-formed or preferred conclusions and attitudes. 1 17 The combined effect of
these behavioral biases is to create pervasive, pro-cyclical underestimation and
mispricing of risk in the increasingly complex financial system-a problem that "can
111. One of the rare attempts to move away from the discussion on institutional structures is Professor
Heidi Mandanis Schooner's recent proposal to expand private right of action in the area of systemic risk
regulation, which would empower broader interest groups to monitor regulatory agencies and financial
institutions. Schooner, supra note 61.
112. See, e.g., McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1644-64 (discussing different categories of so-
called "regulatory contrarians" within regulatory agencies and their potential for acting as guardians of public
interest in financial sector regulation).
113. Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807 (2010).
114. Id. at 810.
115. Id. at 813-15. Examples of typical complexity biases include confirmation bias (an actor's preference
to analyze available information in a way that confirms his or her previous expectations), representativeness
bias (an actor's tendency to assume that a sample from past experience is an accurate predictor of the future
events), oversimplification bias (the use of oversimplified "rule of thumb" heuristics), and authoritarian bias (an
actor's tendency to overvalue information from authoritative sources, based on prestige or scope of formal
powers possessed by the source of information). Id.
116. Id. at 815. Examples of incentive biases include cognitive dissonance bias (an actor's tendency to
avoid the discomfort of seeing things in a way inconsistent with the actor's self-interest) and loss aversion bias
(an actor's desire to avoid recognition of a loss for which the actor bears responsibility). Miller & Rosenfeld,
supra note 113, at 815-17.
117. Id. at 817-18. Examples of asymmetry biases include status quo bias (an actor's tendency to
overvalue the status quo even where the available data strongly suggests taking a different course of action) and
optimism bias (a tendency to ignore information that implies negative conclusions). Id.
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metastasize into a serious threat to the stability of the system as a whole" in times of
unusual market distress. 1 18
Miller and Rosenberg argue that one of the reform measures potentially effective in
combating intellectual hazard in financial markets is the creation of a new systemic risk
oversight body explicitly charged with preserving financial stability.119 However, writing
before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, they expressed skepticism with respect to
the notion of placing systemic risk oversight responsibilities exclusively in the hands of
the existing financial regulators:
Experience suggests that the problem of intellectual hazard will not be
effectively addressed if the personnel in the agency charged with identifying
systemic threats to financial stability are simply recycled regulators and central
bankers. They will not bring new ideas to the table; on the contrary, they will
come as advocates for their agency's positions and as defenders of their
agency's turf and power. These people will suffer from the forms of intellectual
hazard we have already observed in regulators: asymmetry bias embodied in
fixed positions on policy questions, self-serving bias in the form of turf
protection and blame avoidance, and authoritarian bias in the form of deference
to the agencies that delegate personnel to these new monitoring bodies.
A preferable solution would be to establish financial stability boards not
dominated by existing regulators. A truly independent board, composed largely
of people from outside the government, selected according to some principle of
merit rather than political connections, and adequately funded and protected
against retaliation for expressing unpopular views, would offer a potentially
more efficacious approach to the problem of impartially and objectively
identifying systemic threats to the financial system and proposing possible
remedies or solutions. 120
Although Miller and Rosenberg do not directly address the issue of tripartism, their
argument is consistent with the idea of creating an independent source of authority,
located largely outside the existing regulatory hierarchy and serving as an external check
on the process of regulatory decision-making, in order to assure a more objective
assessment of potential systemic threats to financial stability. 12 1 Professors McDonnell
and Schwarcz propose a slightly different approach to the same problem of overcoming
regulators' intellectual entrenchment, inertia, or capture. 122 In particular, they suggest
118. Id. at 820.
119. Id. at 837.
120. Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 113, at 838-39.
121. In 2009, the Investors' Working Group (IWG), an independent nonpartisan commission established
by the Council of Institutional Investors and the Consumer Federation of America, advanced a similar proposal.
Investors' Working Group, COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.cii.org/iwgInfo. The
IWG's reform proposal envisioned the creation of a similarly independent systemic risk regulator whose
members would be appointed by the President and whose primary mission would include collecting,
aggregating, and evaluating information on financial products, markets, and institutions in order to identify
threats to systemic stability. Id. This new systemic risk oversight body would report its findings to Congress and
recommend specific actions to be undertaken by financial regulators, which would have to either comply with
such recommendations or explain their refusal to do so. Id.
122. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48.
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"charging an entity that is affiliated with, but independent of, a financial regulator with
the task of monitoring that regulator and the regulated marketplace and publicly
suggesting new initiatives or potential structural or personnel changes."' 23 The key role
of such "regulatory contrarians" is to help regulators overcome the various cognitive and
incentive biases and "to counteract agency inaction or ossification in the face of changing
market risks."1 24
McDonnell and Schwarcz define a regulatory contrarian as an actor possessing three
key features: (1) it "must be at least partially affiliated with a particular regulatory body
but simultaneously enjoy meaningful independence from that agency;" 1 25 (2) it "must
possess pervasive influence over its affiliated agency by virtue of its position, access to
media and officials, or speaking engagements and reports;"' 26 and (3) it "must be tasked
with studying and identifying deficiencies and potential improvements in the regulatory
process, regulatory policy, and/or the regulated market."1 2 7 The existing examples of
regulatory contrarians include various ombudsman offices, designated consumer
representatives, inspectors general of individual regulatory agencies, and certain research
entities. 128
Importantly, McDonnell and Schwarcz argue that affiliation with, and privileged
access to, regulatory agencies, and the resulting ability to work through informal channels
to achieve better practical results, makes these insider entities particularly effective in
promoting regulatory adaptation to the changing market conditions. At the same time,
they admit that, at least in the realm of financial services regulation, such contrarians'
role and potential to counteract agency inaction has been limited to relatively narrow
domains, such as representing consumer interests or investigating specific instances of
misconduct or waste at the relevant agencies. 129 Nevertheless, McDonnell and Schwarcz
are cautiously optimistic about the emphasis in the Dodd-Frank Act on the creation of
new "research contrarians," such as the OFR or the new Federal Insurance Office, which
they see as a step in the direction of institutionalizing the greater diversity of views in
systemic risk regulation. 130
Whether or not this optimism is warranted remains to be seen, as these new
regulatory contrarians begin their work. More generally, however, McDonnell and
Schwarcz may be overstating the practical ability of any entity formally affiliated with a
regulatory agency to act in a truly independent manner and to provide a meaningful
counterweight to agency inaction, especially on politically salient issues. What they see
as regulatory contrarians' key strength-their embeddedness in the administrative
apparatus-is also their greatest potential weakness.
This Article seeks to take the debate on financial regulation reform a step further by
123. Id. at 1632.
124. Id. at 1645.
125. Id. at 1644. The contrarian's independence must be assured through arrangements relating to its
"budget, staffing, appointment and removal process, or even institutional culture." Id at 1644-45.
126. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1645. McDonnell and Schwarcz stress that a regulatory
contrarian "must have limited, if any, regulatory authority." Id.
127. Id.
128. For a more detailed discussion of the role and activities of these types of govemment actors, see infra
Part IV.B.
129. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1633-34.
130. Id. at 1667-73.
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overcoming what appears to be a pervasive conceptual preoccupation with the structure
and functioning of administrative agencies in charge of financial sector oversight.
Building on scholarly insights discussed above, it attempts to shift the focus away from
the regulatory agencies and to explore potential methods of ensuring some form of direct
public representation in the process of systemic risk regulation. The argument presented
here is based on a conviction that true guardians of public interest must be independent
from both bankers and bureaucrats. While it is true that, with respect to systemic risk
regulation, well-meaning ignorance may be just as problematic as intentional
malfeasance, expanding regulators' access to-and improving their ability to process-
the relevant information is only part of the solution. It is equally important to create, and
continuously enhance, incentives for regulatory agencies and private industry actors to
act in a manner consistent with the long-term public interests of preserving financial and
economic stability and curbing excessive risk-taking in the financial sector.
Introducing some form of tripartism in systemic risk regulation is one potential
method of achieving both of these goals. The presence of an effective third-party
"guardian" at the decision-making table potentially creates a built-in source of
countervailing perspective on substantive policy issues and imposes structural checks on
regulatory capture. Of course, the challenge is to find real-life examples of a successful
tripartite regulatory scheme which would demonstrate the benefits of tripartism in action.
While there may not be a readily available model of classic tripartism in practice, which
could be easily replicated in financial sector regulation, it is instructive to look at the
examples of institutions that perform at least some of the functions of such a public
interest guardian and, by doing so, introduce elements of tripartism into the regulatory
process.
IV. ELEMENTS OF TRIPARTISM IN PRACTICE: "QUASI-GuARDIANS" AT WORK
Tripartism is an inherently broad concept, and it may operate differently in different
regulatory fields.13 1 The wide diversity of institutional forms and normative elements of
tripartite regimes across various contexts makes it difficult to draw generalized
conclusions. In certain cases, tripartite arrangements may exist only on a limited scale or
as part of a broader regime that does not necessarily fit a tripartite model. Nevertheless,
examining how some of these arrangements operate in practice helps to inform our search
for tripartism in financial sector regulation.
As a general matter, it is possible to identify several broadly drawn categories of
institutional actors that, in different ways and to varying degrees, act as representatives or
advocates of the public interest in the regulatory process. Although their official
mandates may not explicitly contemplate acting as a third party representing diffuse
societal interests vis-A-vis regulatory agencies and regulated industries, these institutions
often perform that function in practice. This Part discusses four main types of such
institutions: (1) public interest groups, including various non-governmental organizations,
grassroots activist movements, consumer protection organizations, and so on; (2)
designated public interest representatives within regulatory agencies or separately
13 1. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 58 (stating that "the appropriate model of tripartism
will be an historically and institutionally contingent matter").
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instituted government bodies whose task is to monitor the efficiency or ensure
accountability of regulators; (3) scientific or technical expert councils that help regulators
take action in the public interest; and (4) special advisory commissions, typically
established by Congress to investigate the causes of major crises and to identify the
sources of regulatory failure to protect the public from their re-occurrence.
A. Public Interest Organizations
At first glance, this category of public interest representatives appears almost self-
explanatory. However, the sheer multitude of public interest organizations that operate in
a wide variety of policy areas and pursue many different agendas makes it difficult to
present an accurate assessment of the activities and impact of the group as a whole. The
following discussion sketches out some of the broadly common characteristics of these
diverse organizations.
1. Functions and Activities
These organizations are the purest form of public interest representatives because
they typically emerge organically, driven by the efforts of similar-minded citizens
concerned with particular issues they view as a matter of public importance. This bottom-
up nature of public interest organizations is the source of their key strength: a mantle of
democratic legitimacy and a claim to representation of broad swaths of the interested
citizenry. They vary in size of their membership, the degree of public visibility, and the
nature and scope of their activities, in large part depending on the substantive subject-
matter on which they focus. 132 Their activities may be loosely grouped into the following
inter-related and often overlapping categories.
Advocacy. Public interest groups can, and often do, actively lobby legislatures and
policymakers on the issues of concern to them. By publicizing and investigating specific
instances of wrongdoing on the part of private actors and government entities, these
groups frequently frame the salient issues of public policy and define the terms of the
political debate in the relevant area. Their efforts sometimes trigger legislative and
regulatory responses as well as the changes in the private industry standards of
conduct. 133 Public interest groups often participate in regulatory rule-making by
submitting comments on proposed agency rules, as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 134 or by directly advocating their positions on specific issues on
regulators' rule-making agenda. Thus, under the system of negotiated rule-making,
representatives of public interest groups whose members would be affected by a proposed
132. For an informative discussion and a typology of public interest groups, including pure membership
groups, mass membership groups, and subsidized member groups, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411, 428-
34(2000).
133. See, e.g., Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of
Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & Soc'Y 433 (2003) (analyzing the
emergence and growth of voluntary product certification programs in specific industries).
134. The "notice and comment" provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act generally require that
administrative agencies publish proposed rules and regulations for public comment in advance of their adoption.
Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
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agency rule negotiate with the agency to reach a consensus on the rule before it is
proposed.135
Advisory activities. Public interest groups, or their individual members, may also
participate in various advisory committees established by regulatory agencies. For
example, the Federal Reserve has the Consumer Advisory Council (CAC), whose
mission is to advise the Federal Reserve "on the exercise of its responsibilities under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act and on other matters in the area of consumer financial
services."1 36 Meeting three times a year, the CAC focuses on issues directly related to
consumer finance. 137 However, the practical impact of its recommendations on the
Federal Reserve's decision-making is far from clear. 138 Generally, the ability of these
advisory bodies to shape the regulatory agencies' policies and to effectively counteract
the private industry's influence depends greatly on the relevant agency's resolve to take
their advice seriously.
Private standard-setting. As part of their advocacy and advisory activities, some
public interest groups can also engage in developing substantive or procedural standards
that private industry actors feel compelled to adopt. If successful, this standard-setting is
a potentially important method of promoting public interest. Thus, certain private
certification schemes by various environmentalist and labor groups have contributed to
voluntary improvement of private companies' performance.1 39
Enforcement of existing legal rules. Civic activists and public interest groups often
bring lawsuits against private firms and regulators, seeking to compel them to comply
with specific laws and regulations. This "private attorney general" function is an
important aspect of these groups' activities and a potentially powerful tool in their
arsenal. 14 0 However, in order to bring an action in court, private citizens and public
interest groups must establish legal standing to sue. 14 1 It is particularly difficult to
135. The United States and Congress officially endorsed negotiated rule-making, which supplements the
notice-and-comment procedure for the adoption of administrative rules, in the Negotiated Rule-Making Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 561-70, originally enacted in 1990 and permanently reauthorized in 1996. However, the practical
success of negotiated rule-making has been rather limited, and many public interest groups were less effectively
represented in this process than the regulated industry actors. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1, 78 (1997) (suggesting that, in Environmental
Protection Agency actions, environmental groups were systematically underrepresented). For an analysis of
negotiated rule-making, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance ofNegotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000).
136. Consumer Advisory Council, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs. (June 20, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/cac.htm. The CAC's members represent "consumers, communities,
and the finance services industry" and are appointed by the Federal Reserve for staggered three-year terms. Id.
137. Id. The typical issues discussed at the meetings of the CAC include credit card regulation, mortgage
financing and foreclosures, the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act, and similar issues. Id.
138. The recent crisis clearly demonstrated the Federal Reserve's poor record on consumer protection
issues, which casts doubt on the CAC's practical influence. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 9, at
93-96 (arguing that the Federal Reserve failed to protect consumers from predatory lending and other abuses).
The Council is going to cease its activities once the newly established CFPB commences its operations.
139. See Bartley, supra note 133, at 434-37 (describing the certification structures for environmental and
labor standards in the apparel and forest products industries).
140. Thus, Ayres and Braithwaite assign a critical role to that function of the PIGs in their model of
tripartism. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
141. The requirement of standing stems from the fact that Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits courts
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overcome this hurdle in the context of lawsuits brought under the federal banking laws
where courts have been reluctant to grant any implied right of private action. 142 The
much-discussed judicial deference to agency determinations under various standards of
review further limits the practical efficacy of the public interest representatives' attempts
to enforce the rules in court. 143
Potential use of private litigation as an external check on financial firms and
regulators is inherently limited by the substantive statutes establishing the bases for civil
suits. Currently, the vast majority of private lawsuits against financial institutions are
brought under various federal and state anti-fraud laws. 144 A broad spectrum of
potentially risky conduct by financial market participants does not necessarily implicate
fraud within the meaning of the relevant law, and thus remains outside the private
attorney generals' reach. 14 5
Dissemination of information and public education. An important role of public
interest groups is educating the citizenry on the relevant issues of broad public concern.
By publicizing the instances of firms' or regulators' wrongdoing and explaining their
effect on specific segments of the population or society as a whole, these organizations
enable citizens to participate in policy debate more effectively. Modern information
technology and the rise of social network media give public interest groups a particularly
powerful tool to carry out public opinion campaigns and mobilize the public to act in
defense of the common good. 146
to resolving "cases and controversies." See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding
"the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article Ill"). Generally, the requirement of standing means that the plaintiff must establish the injury-in-fact, the
connection between that injury and the conduct alleged, and a substantial likelihood that the relief sought would
remedy the injury. See Ne. Fla. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993) (holding the
association had standing under an analysis of these three elements). For an example of courts' approach to the
issue of standing in cases involving financial services, see Lee v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
118 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. Schooner, supra note 61, at 1008-09 (discussing private enforcement mechanisms).
143. For example, under the Administrative Procedure Act, any member of the public can bring a lawsuit
in federal court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." Administrative
Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006). However, courts generally apply highly deferential standards of
review to agencies' decisions to delay action or not to act at all. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653,
658 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Absent a precise statutory timetable or other factors counseling expeditious action, an
agency's control over the timetable of a rulemaking proceeding is entitled to considerable deference."); Minn.
Milk Producers Ass'n v. Glickman, 153 F.3d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. I130 (1999) ("[A]
decision to do nothing is entitled to more deference than a decision to act."). As a result, this provision is of
limited usefulness for citizens seeking to force financial regulators to act in the public interest.
144. Thus, most private lawsuits against financial institutions in federal courts are filed under the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, especially Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the SEC's Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). See Schooner, supra note 61, at 1008-11 (discussing the existing models
of private enforcement under federal securities and banking laws).
145. Schooner, supra note 61, at 1011-17 (discussing alternative models of private enforcement to address
systemic risk concerns not effectively addressed under the existing system).
146. The phenomenon of WikiLeaks provides a vivid example of the use of modem technology to
disseminate publicly the information previously accessible only to "insiders." See, e.g., Scott Shane & Andrew
W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at US. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?pagewanted=all (describing the release of secret U.S.
diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks as giving the public an "unprecedented look at backroom bargaining by
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2. Potential Limitations
Despite their importance, public interest groups (or PIGs, in Ayres and Braithwaite's
terminology) may not be the most effective candidates to act as the key representatives of
the public interest in financial sector regulation, especially with respect to systemic risk.
Generally, one of the key limitations of this form of representation is that individual PIGs
are, in essence, private interest groups. 14 7 Individual groups often organize around
relatively narrow viewpoints and focus their efforts on specific issues. It is typically more
difficult for a group to self-organize, from the bottom up, around a broad conceptual
agenda that lacks concrete, often emotional, appeal. This is a particularly serious hurdle
in the area of systemic risk regulation in the financial sector, where access to relevant
information and technical expertise are often critical to one's ability to formulate issues
and to articulate a meaningful policy agenda. The complexity of the problem and the lack
of consensus on the appropriate solutions, even among the experts, further exacerbate this
difficulty.
The secretive, closed-door nature of the decision-making process involving financial
regulators and industry actors makes it effectively impossible for a truly broad-based
grassroots movement to emerge naturally as an advocate for a publicly minded systemic
risk regulation. Even leaving aside the pernicious effects of regulatory capture in the
financial services sector, discussed above, there are various cognitive and behavioral
factors that may preclude financial regulators from accepting public interest groups as a
legitimate third-party participant in systemic risk regulation:
Regulators operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and expertise-based
band of human experience, characterized by relationships with sophisticated
repeat players. In spite of their public-regarding mandate, they may be
cognitively predisposed against "outsiders" who either lack facility with the
dominant jargon, or who take issue with assumptions that no one in the industry
takes issue with. They are also more likely to share social, educational, or
experiential ties with industry actors than with others. Even well-informed
activist shareholders may not receive the same measure of automatic regulatory
respect. 148
Of course, it is possible to envision emergence of a public interest group with the
requisite expertise in financial markets and regulation. 149 One potential model for such a
embassies around the world").
147. In fact, that was the insight behind Ayres and Braithwaite's concept of contestability of guardianship.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 57 (suggesting the notion of "contestable guardianship").
148. Ford, supra note 41, at 614-15.
149. One potentially interesting example of such a group is Better Markets, Inc., a non-profit organization
formed in 2010 by a hedge fund manager, Michael Masters. This organization's self-proclaimed goal is "to
promote the public interest in the domestic and global capital and commodity markets," especially through
participation in the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. About Us, BETTER MARKETS,
http://www.bettermarkets.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). The group's ability to bring on board
industry and government insiders may significantly enhance its ability to engage in the debate on complex
substantive issues in financial regulation. At the same time, however, it may potentially undermine the group's
legitimacy as an unbiased advocate of the public interest. See, e.g., Courtney Comstock, Busted: Meet the
Hedge Fund Manager Pushing the Government's New Attack on Speculators, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-22/wallstreet/30088013_1 gas-prices-michael-masters-speculators
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group is the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a non-profit organization that grew
out of an academic experiment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and that
brings together scientists and policy advocates in an effort to promote environmental
safety goals. 150 However, it seems unlikely that a similar grassroots organization of
academic experts in finance and financial regulation, concerned with safeguarding public
interest in financial stability, would ever appear. Some of the reasons for this pessimistic
view include the fact that the relevant academic community seems to lack the depth, in
terms of the sheer number of active scholars in the area, and tends to be highly
fragmented. Political economists, legal scholars, finance theorists, and social scientists
often do not communicate effectively across the disciplinary lines. Moreover, even within
the same discipline, the variety of competing methodologies and normative approaches
frequently results in rigid intra-disciplinary divisions. There is a wide variety of views on
the causes of, and the cure for, systemic instability. In the absence of incontrovertible
"objective" evidence supporting or falsifying any particular academic view, it seems even
less likely that a critical mass of academic experts will develop a common understanding
of such a complex problem as systemic risk prevention, necessary to form a unified
advocacy movement. 15 1
In the absence of an internally generated expertise, interest groups seeking to
advocate for publicly minded systemic risk regulation would need to have sufficient
resources to hire outside experts. This may be difficult, as public interest organizations
often have limited resources and rely primarily on private donations from individuals and
organizations supporting their mission. By contrast, the financial services industry's vast
resources would render public interest groups perennially outgunned.
The effectiveness of public interest organizations in the financial sector varies across
different areas. To date, public interest groups have been active and relatively successful
in performing most of their typical functions almost exclusively in the area of consumer
protection. 152 Although some of the larger, better-established organizations, such as
Public Citizen1 53 or Americans for Financial Reform1 54 are more actively advocating for
(describing Michael Masters' investment activities). At this point, it is too early to tell whether Better Markets,
Inc. will evolve into a powerful broad-based PIG with superior technical expertise.
150. See About Us, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2012) (describing the organization and its activities). The UCS is highly regarded as a source of independent
scientific research aimed at finding solutions to various global environmental problems and claims significant
success in a vanety of advocacy and advisory initiatives. See History of Accomplishments, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/about/history-of-accomplishments.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2012) (listing the history of accomplishments).
151. Of course, this may be an overly pessimistic view of the situation, as some future events may, in fact,
serve as a powerful catalyst for the formation of an equivalent of the UCS in the area of systemic risk
regulation. One such external event is another major crisis that would alter popular perceptions and encourage
greater numbers of public figures and academics to band together around some of the most important issues in
financial sector regulation.
152. There are several prominent and well-respected PIGs in the area of financial consumer protection.
About Us, NAT. CONSUMER LAW CTR., http://www.nclc.org/about-us/about-us.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012)
(describing the NCLC, a nonprofit advocacy organization that works with economically disadvantaged
Americans); About CRL, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/about-us/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (describing the organization's consumer protection goals).
153. See About Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (defining the
organization's mission as representing citizen interests in Congress).
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a broader spectrum of financial regulation reform in the wake of the global crisis, their
ability to shape actual policy outcomes against the powerful industry lobbying machine
and ideologically captured regulators is likely to remain limited.1 55
B. Government Actors: Proxy Advocates and Agency Monitors
The second group of institutional actors that often act as designated representatives
of the broad societal interests operates within the administrative agency structure. Despite
the differences in their formal mandates, legal status, and jurisdictional powers, all of
these institutions constitute part of an official apparatus of the modem regulatory state.
For the purposes of this discussion, these actors fall into one of two broad and loosely
defined sub-groups: proxy advocates1 56 and agency monitors. 157
1. Proxy Advocates
For purposes of this discussion, a proxy advocate can be defined as a government
actor-a stand-alone agency, a division within an agency, an individual appointed
official, an independent commission, or any other type-whose mission is to represent
some form of public interest in the regulatory process. 158
Designated consumer representatives. Some of the institutions in this category act as
direct consumer representatives in ratemaking or other administrative proceedings,
especially in the context of state regulation of public utilities. 159 Thus, several states
154. See About, AMERICANS FOR FIN. REFORM, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2012) (describing the coalition's goal as "fighting for a banking and financial system based on accountability,
fairness and security").
155. See Kimberly Krawiec, Don't 'Screw Joe the Plummer:' The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform
(Mar. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract
id=1925431 (illustrating the disproportionately low impact of public interest groups on the process of
implementation of the Volcker Rule).
156. The term "proxy advocate" comes from prior academic writings. See, e.g., Daryl G. Stein, Perilous
Proxies: Issues of Scale for Consumer Representation in Agency Proceedings (Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 809798 (examining the historical
and institutional context of proxy advocates at the state and federal levels); William T. Gormley, Alternative
Models of the Regulatory Process: Public Utility Regulation in the States, 35 W. POL. Q. 297 (1982).
157. Professors Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz coined the term "regulatory contrarians" to refer to
agency actors whose mission is to monitor and challenge regulatory agencies' actions or failure to act in the
public interest. See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1632-33. McDonnell and Schwarcz develop a
typology of various regulatory contrarians and "quasi-contrarians" operating in various regulatory areas and
offer an insightful and provocative analysis of their potential role in financial regulation reform. Id. at 1651-66.
The following discussion relies heavily on their analysis but uses less granular categories of proxy advocates
and agency monitors. See also supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
158. Stein defines proxy advocates as "bureaucrats who represent a specified constituency before
administrative agencies." Stein, supra note 156, at 3. As he argues:
[A] proxy advocate can take many forms. It may be a lawyer within the public utility commission,
a division of the office of the attorney general, a separate independent agency, or something else
entirely. Though the institutional design may vary widely, proxy advocates are always government
entities and always advocate for constituency.
Id
159. According to Stein, this is the very essence of a "proxy advocate" model that emerged originally at
state level in connection with public utility regulation. Id. at 3-4. States created these advocates in order to
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currently have so-called Offices of Public Counsel affiliated with their public utilities
regulators.160 In a number of states, the office of the state's attorney general is assigned a
duty to represent consumers in agency proceedings.161 Other states either created a proxy
advocate within the relevant regulatory agencies or placed that responsibility elsewhere
in their executive structure. 162
An interesting example of a proxy advocate outside the traditional context of public
utility regulation is the Funded Consumer Liaison program of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), described by McDonnell and Schwarcz. 163 It consists
of 18 individuals, mostly academics and public interest group representatives, selected on
the basis of publicly submitted nominations.l Consumer liaisons do not have any
administrative powers and do not receive compensation but are given free access to
NAIC resources and discussions.16 5 They identify and present on a wide range of
consumer-related issues at public meetings that NAIC organizes, advocate for specific
action by insurance regulators, and follow these issues across all NAIC organizations. 166
Ombudsmen. Another set of institutions in this general category performs a
somewhat different role of an ombudsman, a body or an individual "tasked with
responding to complaints concerning a specific government agency or other type of
institution." 1 67 The Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) within the IRS is a well-known
example of a relatively well-established and effective ombudsman. 168 The TAS is an
independent organization within the IRS, whose mission includes assisting taxpayers in
resolving disputes with the IRS, identifying systemic problems in the IRS's practices, and
recommending potential administrative and legislative changes to mitigate such
problems.169 Importantly, the TAS submits an annual report to Congress, in which it
outlines the key deficiencies in the IRS's performance and sets forth its proposals and
represent consumers by appearing in ratemaking and similar agency proceedings. Id.
160. See, e.g., McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1655 (stating that California, Florida, Missouri,
and Texas have such Offices, while Texas also has a separate Office of Public Insurance Counsel).
161. As Stein reports, five states mandate that the Attorney General performs this duty directly, while nine
additional states establish a specific position in the Attorney General's office to represent consumer interests.
See Stein, supra note 156, at 31 n.199.
162. According to Stein's study, "in ten states, the proxy advocate is a division of the agency that regulates
utilities. Eighteen states have placed their proxy advocates elsewhere in the state's executive branch." Id. at 310.
163. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1657-59. NAIC is an association of state insurance
regulators.
164. Id. at 1657.
165. Id. at 1658.
166. Id. However, as McDonnell and Schwarcz note, the program's structure partially limits its
effectiveness, as individual consumer liaisons sometimes fail to cooperate on issues that cause substantive
disagreement. Id. at 1658 n.129. Because this is not individual members' primary employment, the degree of
their commitment to fulfilling their duties also may vary.
167. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1653. Notably, Stein explicitly excludes ombudsmen from
his category of "proxy advocates" that is limited to consumer representatives discussed above. Stein, supra note
156, at 5.
168. The IRS originally established the TAS in 1979, and Congress later codified it. For a description of
the TAS's history and evolution, see Evolution of the Office of Taxpayer Advocate, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/evolution-of the-office-of thetaxpayer advocate.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2012).
169. See Evolution of the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=171463,00.html (describing the functions of the TAS).
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recommendations.1 70 This direct line of communication with Congress, and the ability to
make its criticisms of the IRS public, gives the TAS significant power to press for
changes in the IRS's practices from within the agency.
However, it is important not to overstate ombudsmen's ability to act as an effective
representative of the public interest in every context. These agencies deal primarily with
specific disputes and grievances of consumers and other targets of specific regulatory
schemes, typically a well-defined (if not always narrowly defined) constituency. They do
not directly participate in the agency policymaking process. Thus, their role as
independent public interest representatives is inherently limited. 17 1
More generally, all proxy advocates suffer from the same handicap: they operate in
concrete, narrowly defined areas and, in effect, act as another "interest group."' 7 2 They
may be effective in resolving specific issues of consumer protection. However, the
narrow scope of their subject matter and jurisdictional competency makes these actors
incapable of counteracting regulators' failure to act in the public interest in the area of
broader systemic regulation. 173
2. Agency Monitors
This group includes a wide variety of government actors that perform the task of
monitoring regulatory agencies' efficiency and integrity in upholding the laws they
implement and enforce. These institutions' official mandates may not contain explicit
references to protection of the public interest. However, their essential function is to
ensure that regulatory agencies act in accordance with their stated objectives, which
presumably reflect the legislature's concept of public good. These agency monitors
operate at several levels within the federal government: within individual agencies, as
separate agencies, or outside the executive branch altogether.
Inspectors General. Many federal regulatory agencies have an independent office of
Inspector General (IG) operating within their structure under a separate statutory
authority. 174 An IG's mission is to detect and prevent fraud and abuse of administrative
power and to promote government efficiency and effectiveness. 175 Designed to act in a
non-partisan manner, IGs are appointed without regard to their political views and, at
170. See, e.g., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/execsummary_2010arc.pdf The TAS can also take formal administrative
action through the issuance of Taxpayer Advocate Directives, but, as McDonnell & Schwarcz note, prefers to
use soft, persuasive power to effectuate changes in the IRS's practices. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48,
at 1654.
171. As McDonnell & Schwarcz admit, the TAS's "ombudsman contrarian role is limited to issues that
involve the experiences of 'consumers' of this regulation, that is, taxpayers." McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra
note 48, at 1655.
172. See Stein, supra note 156, at 26 (stating proxy advocates have functional similarities to interest
groups that limit their effectiveness).
173. See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 1666 (stating that regulatory contrarians generally have
had little influence in the areas of prudential and systemic risk regulation).
174. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
175. See generally Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office
ofInspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 243 (1999) (providing a history of the creation of IG offices).
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least theoretically, solely on the basis of their integrity and expertise in law, finance, audit
and accounting, or investigations. IGs conduct audits and investigations of their agencies,
focusing on strict compliance with specific legal rules and regulations. IGs submit semi-
annual reports to Congress which identify deficiencies in their agencies' operation and
contain recommendations for improvement. 176 Although IGs do not have authority to
interfere with agencies' substantive regulatory activities, their investigations often
identify serious problems in the agencies' operations and shape internal agency
reforms. 177
A particularly relevant example in this respect is the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), which Congress established
in October 2008.178 The head of SIGTARP is the Special Inspector General (SIG),
appointed by the President, with the consent and advice of the Senate. 179 Congress
created SIGTARP specifically to protect the interests of taxpayers who fund the $700-
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), designed to bail out financial institutions
affected by the financial crisis. 180 SIGTARP's official mission is threefold: to promote
transparency in the administration of TARP, to provide coordinated oversight of the
program's management and operation, and to prevent and detect incidents of fraud,
waste, and abuse of TARP funds. 18 1 Under the statute, SIGTARP is required to audit the
Treasury Department's purchases, management, and sales of assets under TARP
authority and to submit quarterly reports to Congress detailing its audit and law
enforcement activities. 182
SIGTARP has been generally praised for its ability to maintain its independence and
to press aggressively for greater transparency and accountability in the administration of
the bailout programs. 183 To a great extent, this success is attributable to the first SIG,
Neil Barofsky, who actively used the media to publicize his office's findings and issued
176. Inspector General Reform Act § 2.
177. A recent example of an investigation that sparked intense public interest is the SEC Inspector
General's report on the agency's failure to detect and stop Bernard Madoffs fraudulent activities. See SEC,
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S
PONZI SCHEME-PUBLIC VERSION (2009), .available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf
(detailing the SEC's failure to stop Madoff's fraudulent operations). Of course, it is quite ironic that the SEC IG
itself failed to spur the agency into action before the fraud was finally revealed.
178. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 121, 122 Stat. 3765,
3766-3933 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5231). The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-15, 123 Stat. 1603 (2009) extended the duties and powers of the
SIGTARP.
179. According to the EESA, "The appointment of the Special Inspector General shall be made on the
basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations." EESA § 121(b)(2). The SIG is removable under provision
3(b) of the Inspector General Reform Act, which gives the President the power to remove any Inspector
General. Id. § 121 (b)(4) (citing Inspector General Reform Act § 3(b)). When exercising his removal power with
respect to the SIG, the President is required to communicate his reasons for removing the SIG to both houses of
Congress. Id.
180. Welcome, SIGTARP (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.sigtarp.gov/.
181. About Us, SIGTARP (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.sigtarp.gov/about.shtml.
182. EESA § 121(f)(1).
183. See, e.g., Samuel R. Diamant, Neil Barofsky's SIG TARP: "Dificult, Rigorous, and Independent"
Oversight of the TARP, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 313, 324-32 (2011) (highlighting both criticism and praise for
the SIGTARP).
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scathing public criticisms of the government's bailout of AIG and the foreclosure
prevention efforts. 184 Under Barofsky's leadership, SIGTARP has established itself as an
"important public agenc[y]" performing a critical public service by "publicizing
perceived weaknesses and flaws in TARP."' 8 5 However, as with all IGs, SIGTARP
cannot interfere in substantive policy decisions.186 Its authority is clearly limited to
maintaining the integrity of the process through which the agencies manage TARP
funds. 187
In an effort to coordinate its own oversight activities with those of other federal
agencies, the SIG founded the TARP Inspector General Council, comprising the IGs of
the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, SEC, and other agencies whose
activities are relevant to TARP administration. 188 In a similar vein, the Dodd-Frank Act
seeks to strengthen the role of IGs at the federal financial regulatory agencies by creating
a Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight.189 This Council would meet
quarterly to discuss potential systemic risk issues and would report its findings to
Congress and to the FSOC.1 90 This new mission to monitor systemic risk in the financial
sector represents a significant deviation from the IGs' traditional functions, and it
remains to be seen how effective this new Council will be in practice.19 1
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA, which operates as part
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), provides an example of a government
entity established solely for the purpose of monitoring federal regulatory agencies across
the entire executive branch. The key responsibility of OIRA and OMB is to conduct
coordinated review of regulatory agencies' rule-making activities in order to provide
centralized oversight of the increasingly complex administrative state. 19 2 This review
184. Id. See also Brady Dennis, Neil Barofsky, TARP's Outspoken Overseer, Will Resign, WASH. POST,
Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR2011021406089.html.
185. William Perdue, Note, Administering Crisis: The Success of Alternative Accountability Mechanisms
in the Capital Purchase Program, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 295, 334 (2010).
186. EESA § 121(b)(5).
187. Moreover, the office will remain active only for as long as TARP has any outstanding obligations or
assets under management. SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 35 (2011), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2011/April20l1_QuarterlyReport_to Congress.pdf.
188. TARP Inspector General Council, SIGTARP (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.sigtarp.gov/about
council.shtml.
189. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989E, 124
Stat. 1376, 1946 (2010) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 11). This new Council will comprise the IGs of the
existing financial regulatory agencies.
190. Id. § 989E(a)(2)(A)-(B).
191. Thus, the fact that the IG of the SEC has notoriously failed to uncover the SEC's failure to take action
to end Bernie Madoff's fraudulent activities further exacerbates these concerns with the IGs' capacity to serve
as effective systemic risk monitors.
192. Thus, according to a recent study:
OMB is responsible for the coordinated review of agency rulemaking to ensure that regulations are
consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the principles set forth in executive
orders, and that decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or
planned by another agency.
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND
EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS
8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09205.pdf.
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also serves to ensure the Administration's control of agency decision-making. 193 Thus,
OIRA reviews proposed agency regulations for their cost-benefit justification. 194 All
agencies are also required to submit to OIRA a complete agenda of all regulations under
development. In addition, OIRA reviews legislation and congressional testimony
proposed by the administrative agencies under its jurisdiction.195
The focus of OIRA's review is on the cost-benefit analysis of proposed agency
rules, which tends to overstate the more easily quantifiable costs of the proposed
regulation and to discount its potential public benefits. 196 Not surprisingly, commentators
have criticized OIRA for serving as a tool of political control over the regulatory
apparatus, impeding agency rule-making, and effectively acting as a front for
deregulation. 197 Thus, despite its considerable powers to monitor regulatory agencies,
OIRA does not appear to establish itself as an effective counterweight to regulatory
capture, myopia, or sheer incompetence.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO is "an independent, non-
partisan agency that works for Congress."l 98 Congress established the GAO explicitly to
operate outside the executive branch. 19 9 The President selects the head of the GAO, who
serves as the Comptroller General of the United States, from a list of Senate nominees
and appoints the GAO head to serve a 15-year term.2 00 These protections seek to insulate
the GAO from executive influence and to enable it to act as an independent congressional
watchdog.
The GAO supports congressional oversight by investigating the use of public funds,
auditing government agencies, assessing various government programs, performing
policy analyses, conducting extensive research, and providing information requested by
Congress. 20 1 In its reports, the GAO often makes general recommendations on how to
remedy identified problems in agency performance. 202 Thus, the GAO combines the
193. Starting in 1981, President Reagan, by Executive Order, significantly expanded the powers of the
OMB and OIRA, requiring administrative agencies to submit to OMB complete regulatory plans and cost-
benefit analyses for all of their "major rules." See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking:
An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 824-26 (2003) (outlining the history and impact of
Executive Orders 12291 and 12498 on OMB).
194. All regulatory agencies other than those specifically exempted under the Paperwork Reduction Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-SI 1, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20), are required to submit to OIRA
drafts of their proposed rules that constitute "significant" regulatory action (generally, rules that have an
expected annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more) for review. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 31
(describing OIRA's responsibility for reviewing proposed agency rules and testimony).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLtuM. L. REv. 1260 (2006) (advocating the need for OMB and OIRA reform); Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking
the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1355 (2009) (discussing the drawbacks of cost-benefit
analysis for environmental regulation).
197. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 196, at 1304-12 (criticizing ORA).
198. About GAO, U.S. GOv'T AccOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/aboutlindex.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
199. See 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (2006) (stating that the GAO is an instrumentality of the U.S. government
independent of the executive departments).
200. See id. § 703(a)(1)-(2) (stating a method of appointment and term length of the Comptroller General).
201. See About GAO, supra note 198.
202. The GAO makes its reports and testimonies publicly available on its website. See Reports and
Testimonies-Browse By Date, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/browse/date/week
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functions of an auditor, investigator, and policy adviser. The GAO's investigative and
information-gathering efforts, however, focus on government agencies, not private
market participants. 203 In addition, one could argue that the sheer breadth of the GAO's
research and policy analysis potentially undermines its ability to develop truly deep
expertise in such a specialized and complex area as financial sector regulation.
C. Technical Expert Councils
This group of institutional actors includes a wide range of specialized scientific and
technical expert committees that are frequently established by administrative agencies,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).204 To the extent that these independent experts participate in the
regulatory process in order to ensure better protection of public health, safety, and
environment, they can be viewed as "quasi-guardians" of the broader public interest.
For instance, the FDA currently uses 49 scientific expert committees that provide
independent expertise and advise the FDA on scientific issues of regulatory
importance. 205 The agency relies heavily on these scientific advisory committees for
advice on such important issues as approval of new products and the scientific and
clinical issues in product development and evaluation. 20 6 The FDA also uses advisory
committees "to legitimate the soundness of its analysis of a given product, as a public
forum for discussion of controversial issues, and, on occasion, as an 'appeals court' for
disputed agency decisions." 207
Generally, either the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the FDA
Commissioner establishes the FDA's advisory committees. 208 The FDA solicits public
nominations and applications for its scientific advisory committees, but clearly states that
the members must be technical experts in their fields, which include "clinical medicine,
engineering, biological and physical sciences, biostatistics, and food sciences." 209
Besides the proven expertise, the key concern in the process of selecting the members of
the FDA's technical advisory committees is potential financial conflicts of interest. 2 10
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (offering public access to GAO publications, sorted by date).
203. This is a shortcoming common to all agency monitors discussed in this Part. Neither agency IGs nor
OIRA have the authority to demand information from, or enforce compliance with rules and regulations by,
private market actors.
204. Regulatory agencies typically establish these expert councils but some of them are creatures of federal
statutes. For example, in 1978, Congress established the EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4365 (2006) (establishing the SAB). All of these technical expert councils are also subject to the requirements
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770
(1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2).
205. See Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
default.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (offering access to FDA Advisory Committee information).
206. PETER BARTON HUTr ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1575 (2007).
207. Id. at 1573.
208. Id. at 1576. A minority of the FDA's scientific expert councils are statutorily established. These
include the color additive advisory committees and the advisory review panels for medical devices. See 21
U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(C)-(D) (2006) (regarding color additive advisory committees); id. § 360c(b) (regarding
advisory review panels for medical devices).
209. Membership Types, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (July 15, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Advisory
Committees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/MembershipTypes/default.htm.
210. HUTr ET AL., supra note 206, at 1588.
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Congress generally views the use of technical advisory committees by regulatory
agencies as an important mechanism of improving the quality of administrative decision-
making under the condition of scientific uncertainty. 2 11 As some scholars have noted,
these committees also represent an attempt to resolve the fundamental tension between
technocratic expertise and democratic participation. 2 12 Not surprisingly, these institutions
have also generated considerable controversy. Thus, one of the common criticisms of the
FDA expert advisory committees is that they are not truly independent from the agencies
they advise and merely serve as a legitimizing device for the agency's decisions. 2 13
There are also persistent suspicions that the FDA experts tend to favor the industry
because of various hidden or indirect financial conflicts of interest.2 14 Despite these
criticisms, the FDA's use of technical advisory committees serves as an important
example of a tripartite regime that incorporates outside experts as the third party in the
decision-making process, for the purpose of imposing an independent check on the
industry's and the agency's assessments of public risks.
D. Congressional Advisory and Investigatory Commissions
An independent advisory commission is a unique institution "that can arise from but
does not neatly fit into executive, legislative, or judicial archetypes of governmental
power."2 15 Such commissions can be established by nearly any branch of the federal
government: Congress, the President, or an administrative agency. 216 While these special
commissions vary widely in their functions and powers, as a general rule, they fall into
one of two groups: commissions set up to study specific public policy problems (policy
commissions) and commissions focusing on past catastrophic events that had a great
public impact (investigatory commissions). 2 17
The following discussion will focus on congressional advisory and investigatory
commissions. 2 18 A congressional commission is typically established by statute, which
defines its mandate and powers. These commissions function independently from
211. See Lars Noah, Scientific "Republicanism": Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory
Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1034 (2000) ("Congress has come to view expert peer review as a method
for improving agency decision making.").
212. Id. at 1043. Noah expresses some ambivalence about the undemocratic potential of the practice of
"routinely asking independent scientists to referee the work of federal regulatory agencies," which he views as
"something of a throwback to the New Deal's enthusiasm for decision making by expert regulators." Id. at
1037.
213. See id. at 1060 (stating that "soliciting expert input at the front-end of the regulatory process more
closely resembles peer collaboration than peer review").
214. HUTT ET AL., supra note 206, at 1588.
215. Jonathan Simon, Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in an
Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1426 (2005).
216. Id. at 1428 ("Investigatory commissions may be constituted by virtually every department of Anglo-
American government.").
217. Id. at 1436. See also MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN & JACOB R. STRAUSS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40076, CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSIONS: OVERVIEW, STRUCTURE, AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 1
(2011) (characterizing congressional commissions as focused on policy, commemorations, or investigations).
218. Although there is no legal definition of a congressional commission, it has been defined as "a multi-
member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory
capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress." GLASSMAN &
STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 2.
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Congress, and their membership may or may not include any members of Congress. 219
Commission members are often selected on the basis of technical expertise in the subject
area, as well as their reputation for integrity and proven record of public service. 220
These commissions typically have no real administrative authority, so that their only task
is to produce reports and policy recommendations to Congress. Once they complete their
fact-finding and produce reports that detail their conclusions and recommendations for
legislative or executive action, these commissions are typically disbanded. These features
potentially shape the incentives of commission members in a way that enhances their
relative independence. 22 1
However, academics and political observers often criticize congressional
commissions for being used as a purely strategic device, shifting responsibility for
difficult political choices away from Congress. 222 Another common criticism points to
the high costs and potential inefficiency of congressional commissions.2 23 While their
work is typically funded through budget appropriations, there is no guarantee that these
commissions will produce truly unbiased and valuable policy recommendations that
Congress will, in fact, incorporate into its decisions. On the other hand, lack of sufficient
funding often significantly hinders congressional commissions' abilities to fulfill their
missions effectively. Finally, these commissions, whose members are appointed and not
elected, are criticized for their lack of democratic accountability.224
Despite these criticisms, congressional commissions have a great potential to
provide a highly visible public forum for discussing important policy issues and to
advocate policies and reforms that serve the broad public interest. The combination of
technical expertise and the relative independence of commission members potentially
enhances the credibility of commissions' findings and increases the likelihood of
congressional action. Congressional investigatory commissions, which focus on the
causes and impacts of past catastrophic events, typically achieve the highest level of
219. However, members of congressional commissions are appointed either directly by Congress or by the
President, with congressional participation or recommendation. The statutes often mandate that commissions be
bipartisan. Id. at 2, 11. For a detailed discussion of the appointment process, see MATTHEW ERIC GLASSMAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33313, CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP AND APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY TO
ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, BOARDS, AND GROUPS (2009).
220. Importantly, congressional commissions are typically supported by professional staff of technically
skilled lawyers, investigators, and other experts in the relevant subject-matter. Simon, supra note 215, at 1431.
221. According to Simon:
Appointment to a commission, either to membership or staff, may bring prestige that will add
social capital to a person's career, but it typically creates neither long-term obligations nor enduring
opportunities for profit. Thus, in contrast to normal permanent institutions of government,
commissions can exercise judgment from a position of relative independence.
Id.
222. See, e.g., George T. Sulzner, The Policy Process and the Uses of National Governmental Study
Commissions, 24 W. POL. Q. 438, 438 (1971) (explaining that commissions are developing into a new
mechanism of government); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 371, 386-87
(1986) (stating that delegating the responsibility for making difficult decisions to commissioners is one method
of masking legislators' individual efforts); DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 101
(1990).
223. See GLASSMAN & STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 10 (stating that one criticism of congressional
commissions is that they often have high costs and low returns).
224. Id.
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political visibility and generate massive public interest. 225 A well-known recent example
of such a high-profile commission is the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (9/11 Commission), established on November 27, 2002, by President
George W. Bush and Congress to provide a "full and complete accounting" of the attacks
of September 11, 2001, and to issue recommendations on preventing such attacks in the
future.2 26 The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 led Congress to establish two such
important investigatory commissions. First, in 2008, Congress established the
Congressional Oversight Panel for the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (COP),
charged with overseeing the Treasury Department's administration of the $700 billion
TARP bailout. 227 During its tenure, the COP issued several important reports providing
rich empirical detail and analysis on the financial crisis and regulatory reform. 2 28 Second,
on May 20, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009, which created the bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(FCIC). 229 Responding to the growing public outrage at revelations of numerous
instances of blatant misconduct in the financial sector, 230 the statute gave FCIC a broad
mandate to investigate any issue relevant to establishing "the causes, domestic and
global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." 2 3 1 The Act
granted the FCIC the authority to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses and documents
in connection with its investigation.232 Its final report, published in January 2011,
presented a wide-ranging examination of the causes of the crisis, which would not have
225. See id. at 6 (discussing potential value of congressional commissions). This is despite the fact that the
overwhelming majority of congressional commissions established in the last 22 years have been purely policy
commissions. Thus, between 1989 and 2010, Congress established a total of 92 congressional advisory
commissions, but only 7 of them were investigative bodies. Id at 5.
226. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 602, 116 Stat. 2383,
2408-13 (2002). See also Frequently Asked Questions About the 9-11 Commission, NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 21, 2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
about/faq.htm. The Commissioner's Final Report became a national best seller topping the list of most popular
books. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/9I1/report/911Report.pdf.
227. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 112 Stat. 3 (2008);
Emergency Economic Stability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
228. The COP's Final Report was issued on March 16, 2011. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH
OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL (2011), available at
http://www.scibd.com/doc/50880015/The-Final-Report-of-the-Congressional-Oversight-Panel#archive.
229. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
230. Thus, in April 2009, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi called for the formation of a "Pecora-like"
commission to look into the causes of the ongoing crisis. Steven Tavares, Pelosi Calls for Commission to
Investigate Wall Street, COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CAL. (Apr. 15, 2009), http://commonwealthclub.
blogspot.com/2009/04/pelosi-calls-for-depression-era.html (the reference is to the famous Senate investigation
into the causes of the 1929 market crash, which was initiated in 1932 and popularly named after Ferdinand
Pecora who led that investigation).
231. In particular, the statute identified the following areas for investigation by the FCIC: fraud and abuse;
the role of federal regulators; international capital markets; monetary policy and the flow of credit; accounting
standards; tax issues; capital structures; credit-rating agencies; lending practices; relationships between banks,
securities, insurance and other non-banking institutions; size and strength of certain companies; corporate
governance; executive compensation; the housing market; unregulated financial products (including derivatives
and credit default swaps); short-selling practices; and the role of government-sponsored enterprises. Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(c), 123 Stat. 1617, 1626-28 (2009).
232. Id.
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been possible to assemble without the broad statutory authority to gather information
from regulatory agencies and private actors. 233 However, only the Democratic members
of the Commission signed the FCIC's final report, while its Republican members issued
dissenting opinions. 234 Besides potentially undermining the credibility of the FCIC's
findings, this partisan split demonstrates inherent limitations of bipartisan commissions.
Despite their shortcomings, the 9/11 Commission and the FCIC illustrate the
potential for a congressional investigatory commission to move beyond its purely fact-
finding missions and serve as a public forum for a far more powerful "critical
engagement with the government" than is attainable through the ordinary political and
administrative channels. 235 As such, these commissions may function as the modem
medium for a collective exercise of democratic citizenship. However, the temporary
nature of these commissions and their focus on retrospective assessments of the causes
and policy implications of one-time events-typically, major disasters-inevitably limit
their potential to fulfill that role.
E. Summary
To sum up, even a cursory overview of the four principal groups of "quasi-
guardians" of the public interest-public interest organizations, certain government
actors, scientific expert councils, and congressional commissions-highlights the
importance of regulatory design for such groups' effectiveness and independence. The
degree of democratic legitimacy of these institutions, their legal status and position in the
political and administrative hierarchy, the nature and scope of their formal and informal
powers, the source and availability of funding, and access to information and technical
expertise all shape the ability of these institutions to act as effective representatives of the
public interest in the regulatory process.
As this Part demonstrated, the actors in each of these four categories play an
important role in the regulatory process. They formulate and advocate a public point of
view on specific policy issues, help to broaden regulatory agencies' horizons and
improve their decision making, monitor the agencies' compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, and litigate and investigate causes of regulatory failure. Nevertheless,
these "quasi-guardians" generally operate within certain limited areas of competence,
depending on the substantive policy issue or agency decision in question, available
resources, jurisdictional mandates, or functional roles. Largely due to such inherent
constraints, none of these existing mechanisms of public interest representation seem
well-suited for the task of protecting the public interest in preserving long-term systemic
stability in the financial services sector.
V. ENTER THE GUARDIANS: DESIGNING TRIPARTISM IN FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION
This Part outlines a proposal to introduce tripartism in financial sector regulation by
establishing the Public Interest Council (Council), a special body whose sole mission is to
represent the public interest in preserving financial stability and minimizing systemic
233. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 9.
234. See id. at 411-536 (providing the statement of the dissenting FCIC members).
235. Simon, supra note 215, at 1423.
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risk. The proposed approach seeks to synthesize various normative and descriptive
aspects of the concept of tripartism discussed above. In effect, the Council is envisioned
as a body that combines direct participatory aspects of a public interest group with the
technical expertise of scientific advisory committees, enjoys broad information-gathering
and investigative powers typically granted to administrative agencies, and is structurally
independent from the executive branch of the government. Overall, the proposed Council
is similar to a congressional advisory and investigatory commission functioning on a
permanent rather than temporary basis.2 36
The outlined approach is not a fully developed legislative proposal and leaves many
important details to be filled in later. Practical implementation of such a radically novel
mechanism is bound to face numerous challenges and raise difficult questions. Rather
than providing complete answers to those questions, this Part pursues a far more modest
goal: to sketch out the principal framework within which a new form of tripartite
systemic risk regulation might emerge.
A. Public Interest Council: A Proposal Outline
This Article argues that, in order to address effectively the problem of systemic risk
in the financial sector, it is necessary to introduce the public interest directly into the
regulatory process. It is critical that the Council represents broader societal interests in
preserving long-term financial systemic stability, rather than the more narrowly drawn
consumer interests. To the extent there are viable public interest organizations in the
financial services sector, however, they typically engage in the traditional consumer
advocacy. Moreover, the complexity and the technical nature of the key issues in
systemic risk regulation decrease the likelihood that a grassroots movement with an
explicit focus on such issues would organically emerge in the area of financial services
regulation. To remedy this problem, this Article proposes the creation of a special
government body that would act as a functional equivalent of such a public interest
group: the Public Interest Council.
In designing the Council, the key challenges are to ensure that it (1) possesses the
requisite expertise; (2) is able to influence regulatory outcomes; and (3) is sufficiently
independent from the regulators and the industry. 237 Developing a comprehensive
blueprint for this new entity is a complex task that would require meticulous
consideration of numerous legal details. The following discussion offers a broad outline
of the proposed Council's composition, powers, and responsibilities. Some of the
potential difficulties and objections to this proposal are addressed in Part V.B below.
1. Creation and Status
Congress would establish the Council by statute as an independent, non-partisan
government instrumentality that is outside both the legislative and executive branches.
This special status would make the Council similar to both the GAO and a congressional
236. In that sense, this Article envisions a form of tripartism that is different from the Ayres and
Braithwaite's original model commonly associated with this term.
237. This approach is similar to Levine's argument that "[t]he major design challenges are to create a
Sentinel that is (1) politically independent, (2) independent of financial market, and (3) expertly staffed."
Levine, supra note 99, at 22.
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advisory commission, such as the FCIC.238
It is critical that Congress does not set the Council up as an administrative agency,
along the lines of Levine's Sentinel. 2 39 Being a creature of Congress, directly
accountable to it, the Council would enjoy structural and political independence from the
President and the regulatory agencies. Its actions and decisions would not be subject to
the constraints and requirements of the administrative process and would not be
vulnerable to internal veto or other bureaucratic interference. Besides the freedom from
direct political and administrative pressure, this outside location would enhance the
Council's ability to bring a fresh external perspective on the substantive regulatory
issues, which is essential for its ability to counteract financial regulators' cognitive biases
and ossification. From this perspective, the proposed Council would be potentially far
more effective than any designated "regulatory contrarian" located inside, or attached to,
a regulatory agency. 24 0 This special status as an independent body outside the traditional
government branches would also strengthen the Council's claim to legitimacy as a third
party representing the public interest in the regulatory process. Public perceptions and
reputational factors are critically important to the Council's credibility and, ultimately,
ability to fulfill its mission effectively.
The Council would be funded through congressional appropriations. An alternative
approach could be to fund the Council from the Federal Reserve's budget or through
some form of industry assessments. 24 1 If feasible, this arrangement would enhance the
Council's political independence from Congress and ensure sufficient financial resources
for its operations. 242 In any event, it is crucial that the Council has sufficient financial
resources to support the hiring of technically skilled permanent staff at competitive salary
levels and, if necessary, temporary outside consultants. 24 3
238. See supra notes 198-203, 215-35 and accompanying text (detailing the background of the GAO and
congressional advisory commissions).
239. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text (describing Levine's proposal).
240. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of "regulatory contrarians"
advanced by McDonnell & Schwarcz).
241. There are examples of various regulatory bodies obtaining funding through industry assessments.
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the OFR, located in the Treasury Department, will fund itself through
special fee assessments on certain financial institutions subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 155, 124 Stat. 1376, 1419
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5345). Similarly, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a
non-profit corporation established by Congress to oversee audits of publicly-traded companies, is ftnded
through industry assessments. About the PCAOB, PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/about/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
242. For example, under Levine's proposal, the Sentinel would receive 30% of the Federal Reserve's
profits and would return the unused funds to the Treasury Department. Levine, supra note 99, at 23.
243. The Council's permanent staff should include not only lawyers, accountants, and economists, but also
experts in organizational behavior, psychology, information science, sociology, and a variety of other
disciplines.
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2. Membership: Composition, Selection, Removal
It is important that membership of the Council is a highly paid full-time job rather
than a part-time avocation.244 The members of the Council would be appointed by
Congress for staggered terms, based on publicly solicited nominations. 245 The Council
would be explicitly set up as a non-partisan body so that its members would be appointed
without regard to their party affiliations. 246
One possible approach would be to establish two classes of Council membership: (1)
"expert" members, who would constitute at least two-thirds of the Council's membership,
and (2) "public advocate" members. 24 7 Members of both classes would have identical
rights and obligations on the Council, but their nomination and appointment would
follow technically separate processes. 24 8
Specifying qualifications for appointees in the statute is important not only in order
to ensure the Council's technical expertise, but also to ensure its greater political
independence and to limit the potential for partisan or ideologically driven
appointments. 2 49 Thus, all expert members would have to meet strict qualification
criteria, including having proven ability to understand, analyze, and critically assess
public policy implications of issues in financial services regulation. These expert
members would have to have an established academic or technical expertise in
economics, business, financial law and regulation, political economy, social sciences, and
other areas relevant to financial services regulation. 250 As a result of this "recognized
expertise" requirement, the majority of the Council's expert members would comprise
244. Thus, as Rachel Barkow argues, "representing the public cannot be a part-time job. It is a full-time
task that requires sufficient staffing and funding to allow public advocates to properly monitor agency actions
and to challenge those actions where appropriate." Barkow, supra note 70, at 63.
245. The limited term of the members' service on the Council would help to shape their incentives in a
way that enhances their independence. See Simon, supra note 215 (discussing how limited appointment terms
allow commission members to exercise independent decision making). As noted before, the temporary nature of
congressional advisory commissions is one of the mechanisms of ensuring their independence. Id. This is one of
the key reasons to doubt the ability of any regulatory agency to act as an effective guardian of the public
interest. Id.
246. The FCIC's experience shows how a bipartisan structure can be divisive and counter-productive.
247. It is difficult to define, at this point in the project, what would be an optimal number of members for
the Council to have. Thus, one starting point could be a total of 12: 8 expert members and 4 public advocate
members. The statute could also set the range for the number of members (e.g., between 9 and 18). In any event,
for the various reasons discussed below, it is important that expert members significantly outnumber public
advocate members, as it would potentially enhance the Council's ability to fulfill its mission, by raising its
overall level of technical expertise and potential independence.
248. It may also make sense to set a shorter tenure term for expert members of the Council than for public
advocate members. Partly, it may be necessary as a practical consideration, because members of academia who
are appointed to serve on the Council may have to return to their universities or other academic institutions to
resume their teaching and research activities.
249. See Barkow, supra note 70, at 47 (arguing that specifying qualifications for agency appointees in the
statute limits the possibility of partisan appointments).
250. It is critical not to limit this list of potential areas of expertise to the usual realm of law, economics,
and finance. To overcome the intellectual shortcomings of the pre-crisis regulatory paradigm, the Council
should also include experts in psychology, political science, sociology, history of business and finance, and
other academic disciplines typically excluded from the conversation on financial regulation. Expanding the
Council's intellectual breadth and range of scholarly perspectives would greatly increase its ability to take a
fresh critical look at many regulatory issues.
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academics in these various disciplines, although it would also allow the inclusion of non-
academic experts in this area. 251
Public advocate members would have to satisfy less rigorous technical expertise
requirements, as their key qualification would be a proven record of public interest
service. 2 52 These members would most likely be representatives of consumer protection
groups, public interest organizations, public pension funds, possibly major labor
unions-a broadly defined universe of PIGs, as Ayres and Braithwaite envisioned it. 253
All members of the Council would also have to satisfy the strict independence
criteria; they can neither be employed by nor receive compensation from financial
services industry or financial regulatory agencies on the date of their nomination or at any
time during some reasonable period-which probably should not be less than two
years-prior to such a date.2 54 Members of the Council would also be prohibited from
accepting such employment or compensation from the financial institutions and
regulators for a reasonable period of time after they complete their service. 2 55 These
provisions would decrease the possibility of the "revolving door" effect distorting the
incentives of the Council members to act purely in the public interest. 256
To further reduce the chances of politically or ideologically motivated appointments,
it would be important to provide additional checks in the congressional appointment
25 1. Such non-academic experts may include former industry insiders or financial regulators who have
been openly critical of their former brethren. Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, or former
investment banker, William D. Cohan, come to mind as examples of such individuals.
252. Of course, this in no way implies that these public advocate members are intellectually inferior to
academics or other technical experts on the Council. In fact, many of the public interest representatives, as that
term is used in this Article, are going to have a wealth of knowledge and practical experience in dealing with
the financial industry and its regulators, and their opinions and unique perspective would be just as valuable as
those of any other Council member.
253. See supra Part III.A. The process of public nomination and selection of the representatives of these
different PIGs may, in some ways, approximate the contestability regime envisioned by Ayres and Braithwaite.
254. This conflict of interest provision is critically important and needs to be crafted carefully, taking into
account a variety of situations in which overly strict formalistic prohibitions may be counterproductive. Thus,
the statutory provisions would have to be drafted in a way that provides for certain exceptions (e.g., a small
honorarium received by a candidate for speaking at a public event partially sponsored by a financial institution,
if the sponsor neither selected the speaker nor in any way influenced the contents of the speaker's statements).
The length of the "look-back" period may also be adjusted to accommodate certain situations.
255. Non-compete provisions typically found in certain private contracts may provide a basis for drafting
this provision. Two years seems to be an optimal length of this prospective "black-out" period, but there could
be exceptions.
256. Imposing post-employment restrictions is a well-known and generally embraced method of
counteracting the pernicious effects of the "revolving door." See Levine, supra note 99, at 23 (stating that the
senior members of the Sentinel would be prohibited from receiving compensation from the financial services
industry after the completion of their tenure at the Sentinel). See also Barkow supra note 70, at 48 (describing
the "standard solution" to the revolving door problem by placing "meaningful limits" on employment choices of
agency executives after their service has ended). However, as Barkow notes, these restrictions have a cost, as
they make it potentially more difficult to attract highly qualified people to join the agency in question. Id at 49.
Importantly, the fact that the majority of the Council members are likely to be scholars and employees of public
interest organizations may significantly mitigate this chilling effect. In particular, academics holding tenured
appointments at their home institutions are less likely to be deterred by the potential foreclosure of prospective
private industry employment. Even for non-tenured academics, or those interested in private consulting
opportunities, the prestige, professional recognition, and intellectual satisfaction associated with serving on the
Council are likely to provide a strong incentive to accept nomination.
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process. One potential check could be a requirement to publish a list of all nominees and
invite public comments on their qualifications. Depending on the number of nominations
it may make sense to create a shorter list of finalists whose credentials would then be
vetted through some form of a "peer review" after the general public comment period.25 7
This would allow Congress to base its appointment decisions on a firmer basis, while also
limiting its discretion. Finally, members of the Council would be subject to removal by
Congress only for good cause, which would create an additional layer of political
insulation for the Council.2 58
3. Powers and Responsibilities
In order to create a working tripartite system in the financial sector regulation, it is
critical to ensure that the Council has statutory powers enabling it to influence the
regulatory process so it does not serve as a merely consultative body or a token public
interest representative. Being outside the executive branch, the Council would not have
any direct administrative powers. It would not have any rule-making or enforcement
authority and would not be able to override regulatory agencies' decisions or to compel
them to take, or refrain from taking, any specific action. 259 In effect, the Council would
257. This type of review would be similar to academic peer review for purposes of granting academic
tenure, or to soliciting input from character witnesses for purposes of admitting lawyers to the bar. For example,
Congress would ask several (three or five) people, who are professionally active and respected in the same
general field as the individual nominee, to evaluate his or her qualifications to serve on the Council. For
academics or other expert members, the peers would be other academics or experts in the field. For public
advocate nominees, the appropriate peers may include other recognized members of the public interest
community. The reviewers would be asked to evaluate not only the expertise and technical ability of the
nominees but also their personal and professional integrity and dedication to public service. Of course, one of
the key issues that needs to be addressed here is how to select the proper "peers" for each individual nominee so
as to avoid biased assessments.
258. It has long been recognized by administrative law scholars that limits on the power of removal is one
of the key tools to ensure political independence of the government actors. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 94-106 (1994) (analyzing the scope and
nature of the President's removal powers).
259. It is critically important to limit the Council's powers and activities to those related strictly to
gathering and dissemination of information, in order to avoid potential violations of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. In the context of the modem regulatory state, the strictest interpretation of this doctrine
has been largely replaced by a more nuanced concept of the constitutional checks and balances among the three
main branches of the U.S. government. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 616-21 (1984) (discussing the "checks and
balances" approach to understanding interactions among the branches of the government). The precise scope of
the doctrine of separation of powers continues to be the subject of a complex and constantly evolving debate
among constitutional scholars and courts. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers
law needs to be reconstructed); Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63
ADMIN. L. REv. 467, 468-69 (2011) (contrasting the strong ideal of separation of powers with the reality of a
complex expansion of the regulatory state).
For the purpose of the present discussion, the key is to ensure that the proposed Council's functions
and powers stay within the bounds of constitutionality, as set forth in the existing precedent. See, e.g., Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (holding the vesting of an enforcement or judicial power in a legislative
agent, subject to removal only by Congress, violates the principle of separation of powers); Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-60 (2010) (holding that imposing dual for-cause
limitations on the President's power to remove members of a body that exercises executive and enforcement
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function as a kind of permanent congressional advisory commission, whose core mission
would be to put the financial services industry and the regulators overseeing it under a
constant and intense public scrutiny. It would focus on detecting potential sources of
systemic risk or instability in the financial system and identifying the gaps and
inefficiencies in regulatory and legislative responses to such risk. In a very fundamental
sense, the Council would function as the public guardian of long-term stability and
integrity in financial markets, seen as a public good and a matter of utmost public
concern.
Like a congressional commission, the Council would have broad statutory authority
to request any information it deems necessary from any governmental or non-
governmental actor. 260 To bolster its information-gathering ability, the statute would
have to grant the Council full subpoena powers with respect to any documents or any
testimony that would assist the Council in fulfilling its duties. 26 1 The Council would
conduct interviews, informal inquiries, and more formal hearings. It would also hold
informational meetings and discussions on any issue it determines to be deserving of
attention.2 62
It is critically important to ensure that the Council's members and staff work closely
with the FSOC and the OFR, an independent research office inside the Treasury
Department established under the Dodd-Frank Act.26 3 The OFR's primary objective is to
support the FSOC's regulatory functions by researching and identifying sources of
potential systemic risk.264 The OFR has broad authority to collect data from financial
institutions2 65 and to standardize the data that other regulators provide to the FSOC. 266
Besides leveraging the Council's resources, full access to OFR's data and expertise
would allow the Council to fulfill its mission far more effectively and to become a fully
authority violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers). To avoid crossing these constitutional
lines, Congress may delegate to the Council only those powers that are constitutionally vested in Congress,
which generally include the investigative and publicity powers of the kind envisioned under this proposal. See,
e.g., Kalah Auchincloss, Congressional Investigation and the Role of Privilege, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 165,
167-79 (2006) (detailing the historical evolution and scope of the congressional investigative powers).
260. By contrast, Levine's Sentinel, whose sole task is to monitor and assess regulatory agencies'
performance, would not have the power to demand and collect information from private market participants.
For a discussion of Levine's model, see supra Part III.B.l.
261. This power to demand documents and compel testimony would allow the Council to overcome the
fundamental problem that all public interest groups face: access to privileged information. Government "quasi-
guardians"-proxy advocates and agency monitors-have access to information inside regulatory agencies but
typically lack such access to private market information, which is the key to effective assessment of regulatory
responses to market developments.
262. Thus, some of these discussions and meetings would be purely informational, as the members of the
Council would gain a better understanding of a particular issue or practice in financial markets. It would invite
financial industry professionals, lawyers, accountants, or any other private experts to make presentations to the
Council or to answer specific questions on the issue. Based on this information and its internal staffs research,
the Council may decide not to pursue the issue further, to flag it for ongoing monitoring, or to expand the scope
of its inquiry.
263. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 152, 124 Stat.
1376, 1413 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342).
264. Id. § 153(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5343).
265. Id. § 154(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5344).
266. Id. § 153(c)(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5343).
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integrated party in the emerging architecture of systemic risk regulation. 267 It would also
be helpful to ensure that the Council collaborates and coordinates its research and policy
analysis with the GAO and the CFPB.
Members of the Council would have the right to participate in interagency
meetings-including the meetings of the FSOC-where major policy issues are
discussed. Upon request, they would be included in internal meetings at regulatory
agencies. 268 All financial regulators would be obligated to inform the Council in advance
of any proposed or planned rule-making and to include members of the Council in the
process of negotiating and writing their rules and regulations. 26 9 Moreover, financial
regulators would be required to provide periodic overviews of their activities to the
Council, whereby each agency would describe all significant developments in their
formal and informal rule-making and enforcement activities, identify key items on their
ongoing regulatory agenda, and explain their policy priorities. 2 70
Importantly, in these periodic status reports, the agencies would have to include an
overview of significant trends and issues in their informal decision-making, such as
issuance of individual orders, interpretations, guidance documents, policy statements, and
similar administrative actions that often fly under the public radar.2 7 1 Not subject to the
267. It is important to acknowledge the inherent difficulty with providing the Council with such a broad
access to private market information. Financial institutions, whose profitability often hinges on their ability to
capitalize on the next great innovative financial product that is yet unknown to their competitors, guard the
information on their products and clients very closely. Given the firms' heightened concern with the privacy
and confidentiality of the data they consider pertinent to their trading or investment strategies, it is a near
certainty that any proposal to share such proprietary information with non-regulators would meet with the
powerful industry opposition. Some commentators have criticized the Dodd-Frank Act's information collection
and transparency provisions as creating a lot of uncertainty with respect to confidentiality of sensitive market
data, and questioned the scope of the FSOC's and OFR's statutory authority to gather detailed transactional data
from market participants. See Margaret E. Tahyar & Annette L. Nazareth, Transparency and Confidentiality in
the Post Financial Crisis World-Where to Strike the Balance?, I HARv. BUS. L. REV. 145, 158-80 (2011)
(discussing "threats to the confidentiality of information obtained by the FSOC and OFR").
Finding a sensible compromise on the issue of data confidentiality is one of the critical challenges in
the implementation of the proposal advanced here. The process of defining that important balance in the
operation of the already existing OFR and FSOC may provide a valuable template, and define certain
parameters, for addressing this problem with respect to the proposed Council's activities. Moreover, given the
nature of the Council's own investigations, not involving direct access to the information gathered by the FSOC
and OFR, it seems unlikely that the Council would ever require private market participants to divulge the
especially sensitive individual trade and position data. Nevertheless, protecting market participants' legitimate
expectations of data confidentiality remains an important concern that requires a fair and carefully crafted
solution.
268. However, there may be certain exceptions for agency meetings that require a higher degree of
confidentiality. See supra note 267.
269. This is a very important provision, insofar as financial regulators often conduct extensive informal
discussions of proposed rules with the financial services industry representatives, and that is where much of that
"undue influence" and "ideological capture" actually happens. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Giving the Council direct access to these discussions would introduce an important check on this process.
270. As part of this periodic review, it would make sense for the Council to have a separate discussion with
the IG of the relevant agency regarding any significant trends in the agency's compliance with the applicable
rules and regulations and other issues that the IG internally monitors. Again, the Council would use these
periodic reviews purely for the purposes of information-gathering and analysis.
271. For a discussion of these forms of administrative decision-making, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2004) (arguing that "agencies are permitted to
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"notice and comment" requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, these
administrative decisions are frequently used for de facto substantive rule-making, which
may have far-reaching consequences. 272 The Council would be in a position to scrutinize
each agency's pattern of using this subterranean form of administrative decision-making
and to detect any potential public policy concerns it may raise. 273
In this respect, the Council should be explicitly given statutory authority to probe
regulatory agencies' determinations that any particular informal administrative action it
took was "in the public interest." This is a common condition that statutes impose on the
agencies' grant of exemptions from statutory requirements, extensions of certain grace
periods, and other exercises of regulatory discretion to ease the burden on private market
participants. Currently, there is no regularized external review of agencies'
determinations that any such discretionary action was in the public interest, unless a
particular agency decision is challenged in court.274 Often, financial regulators exercise
their discretion to grant important benefits to financial institutions, while including only a
standard cursory reference to the "public interest." 2 75 Knowing that they may have to
defend their reasoning and explain the basis for their "public interest" determinations in
front of the Council would force financial regulators to take their "public interest" charge
far more seriously, and to engage in a real analysis of the broader systemic effects of their
actions.
Another important tool for monitoring potential sources of systemic risk, and for
keeping both the regulators and the industry under constant watch, would be the
Council's targeted investigations of specific issues in financial markets. For instance, if
members of the Council-or its staff-notice a recent spike in trading volume or overall
size of the market in a particular complex financial product, the Council may initiate an
inquiry into the issue. As part of that inquiry, the Council would hold a series of
interviews and informational meetings with representatives of various financial firms,
select their preferred policymaking form without providing an explanation for that choice").
272. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of
Banking", 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1041 (2009) (examining how the OCC used interpretive letters to grant and
expand national banks' legal authority to conduct derivatives trading and dealing activities).
273. This broad authority of the proposed Council to demand information and cooperation from regulatory
agencies is inevitably going to impose significant costs on such agencies, which are already frequently strapped
for resources. However, given the goals of the proposed Council as a guardian of the public interest in
preserving systemic stability, traditional cost-benefit analysis is not likely to provide an accurate assessment of
its activities. Partly, a solution may be to shift the increased costs to the financial services industry. Partly,
however, the problem may require a shift in our thinking about what it entails. Thus, it is no secret that financial
regulators are currently spending an enormous amount of time and resources on meetings and discussions with
industry representatives and lobbyists. It should be possible-and, indeed, seems only fair-to reapportion the
regulators' resources in order to provide the taxpayers' representatives with meaningful access to their decision-
making.
274. Even if an agency action is challenged in court, the outcome of the case rarely ever turns on the
"public interest" determination but instead focuses on whether the agency's decision violates substantive
statutory provisions involved.
275. For example, the OCC's interpretations that permitted national banks to engage in derivatives dealing
and trading transactions typically contained a short statement to the effect that the OCC's decision was "in the
public interest" because it benefitted the bank and its institutional customers. In effect, the OCC's reasoning
equates a benefit to the bank with the public benefit. See Omarova, supra note 272 (detailing the OCC's
reasoning in numerous interpretations of bank permissible derivatives activities).
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asking them to explain to the Council and its staff how exactly that particular product
works, what economic and financial needs it is designed to satisfy, who the clients for the
product are, what its potential uses and systemic linkages are, and how the dealers and
market participants manage specific risks associated with that product. The Council
would also question representatives of regulatory agencies as to their views on the subject
and ask them to describe and explain specific agency actions-or, more importantly, lack
of action-with respect to that particular market. If necessary, the Council would also
bring in outside researchers and consultants to advise it on the potential risks and benefits
of the financial product. In essence, this process would be somewhat similar to the
FCIC's hearings (albeit less formal, in most cases). One crucial difference, however, is
that the Council would conduct an inquiry before the catastrophe hits, while there may
still be plenty of opportunities to correct potential problems.
Having academics as members of the Council would be especially valuable in the
context of this type of ex ante investigations because it would be very difficult for any
investment banker or agency technocrat to dismiss their inquisitors as intellectually
inferior, technically incompetent, or unable to understand complicated concepts.276
Academics are professionally trained to question assumptions and methodologies
underlying assertions, and typically do not hesitate to voice their curiosity or doubt.
While not all of the expert members of the Council may, in fact, be experts in specific
methods of financial engineering, it seems fair to say that if, after hearing all the
explanations and examining all the data presented to them, these academics remain less
than fully convinced that the industry and the regulators have the new product's risks
"under control," there is a high likelihood their doubts need to be taken seriously.
If the Council determines that, as a result of its information-gathering, reviews, and
investigations, it has significant concerns with respect to certain potentially risky market
developments or inadequacies in regulatory oversight, it would have the authority to take
the following actions. First, the Council would have the right to submit a formal request
to the relevant agency to take certain actions: to conduct a study of the identified issues,
to issue regulations, or to consider taking various supervisory or enforcement
measures.2 77 The Council's request would become a part of the administrative record,
and the agency would be obligated to provide a written response to the Council detailing
its plan to address the Council's concerns or explaining its reasons for refusing to do
so. 2 78
276. Anecdotally, this stereotype seems to be deeply ingrained in the common attitude of Wall Street
insiders toward "outsiders," particularly "public interest die-hards" or those who are critical of the financial
industry's practices (and, thus, presumed to be largely ignorant). In fact, elite bankers and their lawyers in New
York City often privately express the same disdain for the regulators, some of whom they nevertheless later
welcome through the "revolving door." Treating personal financial success as a direct measure of an
individual's merit and intellectual capacity is an integral part of Wall Street's ontology. Forcing the industry to
face an intellectually powerful and well-credentialed group of "public interest die-hards" with the statutory
authority to demand answers to tough questions may be a necessary first step toward changing the financial
industry's culture in the long run.
277. In particularly troublesome cases, the Council may ask the agency to impose either a temporary ban
or a permanent prohibition on a particular product or activity until all necessary studies or rule-making are
completed.
278. It is important to reiterate that in order to avoid violating the constitutional principle of separation of
powers, the Council would not have the authority to compel any regulatory agency to take the requested action,
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Secondly, the Council would submit a formal statement to Congress describing its
conclusions, concerns, and detailing its communications with the regulatory agency. 27 9
At a minimum, this statement would put Congress on notice with respect to what the
Council considers to be a potential problem in systemic risk regulation. The Council
would also have a separate right to petition Congress to take legislative action, or to
conduct further hearings at the congressional level, on specific issues. Congress would
not be legally obligated to act in response to the Council's statements. However, having
this direct warning in the public record would limit lawmakers' ability to shift blame by
claiming innocence and lack of knowledge, if the Council's fears come true in the future.
This factor is likely to shape their incentives to take some action.280
The Council's key statutory duty would be to provide periodic (annual or semi-
annual) reports to Congress and the President containing its expert assessment of the
current state of systemic risk regulation, identifying significant potential sources of risk
in the financial sector, and outlining its policy recommendations. In addition, the Council
would have to issue an annual public report-a version of "The State of Our Financial
Union" address-which would convey directly to the members of the general public, in a
clear and popularly accessible manner, the Council's key concerns, conclusions, and
priorities for the next year. 28 1 After all, if the Council is an official representative of the
public, it must keep the public fully apprised.2 82
There are also important strategic reasons for the Council to cultivate and maintain
strong public communication channels. In the absence of independent rule-making or
enforcement powers, the key weapon in the Council's political arsenal would be its
power to mobilize public opinion around pertinent issues in financial services
regulation. 283 That goal requires an ability to communicate the Council's findings and
concerns directly to the public. 284 In today's world of social media and other innovative
forms of mass communication, the Council can harness the power of its word to educate
the public on important trends in systemic risk regulation, which typically do not receive
much public attention, and to generate mass political support for the actions it considers
necessary. Skilled use of the media would allow the Council to build its independent
or to unilaterally override any agency action.
279. The statute may provide that, whenever the Council submits an official action request to any
regulatory agency, it must notify Congress of such request.
280. The Council should also be able (or even required) to submit either a separate statement, or copies of
its formal submissions to the regulators and Congress, to the President.
281. In this public report, the Council would evaluate, among other things, the individual regulatory
agencies' responsiveness to its requests and disclose the instances when an agency refused to take an action
requested by the Council in connection with its targeted issue reviews. This evaluation would put additional
pressure on financial regulators to collaborate with, and be responsive to, the Council.
282. Conversely, members of the public should be able to have access to the Council, so citizens can
communicate their concerns and ideas to the Council's members and staff. It is also necessary to consider
whether it makes sense to establish some form of public evaluation of the Council's performance.
283. Thus, as Simon notes, the 9/11 Commission had a far greater public impact than previous
investigative commissions because the Commission had extraordinary access to intelligence information and
skillfully used the media to effectively communicate its ongoing findings and activities to the public. See
Simon, supra note 215, at 1447-48 (describing the 9/11 Commission's "highly innovative" approach to
publicizing its findings).
284. Of course, there are important considerations of confidentiality of certain market information that
would have to be taken into account when the Council issues any public communications.
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power base, which is necessary for the emergence of a functioning system of
tripartism. 285 In the apt words of Ayres and Braithwaite: "Where there is no power base
and no information base for the weaker party, tripartism will not work. The tripartism
idea is fundamentally about transcending the shallow liberal notion that all you need to
do to solve the problem of weaker parties is to give them legal rights." 286 The proposal to
create the Public Interest Council seeks to empower the weaker party in the financial
regulation game: the broader society that exists outside the confines of Wall Street but
inevitably bears the brunt of the financial and economic crises created by its wizards.
B. Potential Challenges on the Path to Tripartism
This Article calls for a radical change in the existing regulatory paradigm. As any
intellectual experiment, this proposal is bound to face numerous implementation
challenges and to invite many criticisms. Some of these challenges and criticisms, and the
issues for further research such criticisms raise, are outlined below.
1. Defining "Public Interest"
The normative justification for the creation of a tripartite system of financial
services regulation, advanced in this Article, rests on the perceived necessity to introduce
public interest representation directly into the process of systemic risk regulation. 287 This
raises the fundamental question: What exactly is the "public interest" in this context, and
who defines the substantive meaning of that term? As scholars have long recognized,
defining "public interest" as an independent rationale for economic regulation is
inherently vulnerable to criticisms as excessively abstract, vague, and analytically
weak. 288 In the context of financial services regulation, it is particularly difficult to
defend regulation restricting activities of private market participants on the basis of a
generalized "public interest," as opposed to economic or market "efficiency." 2 89 It is
hard to deny that more profitable banks or more liquid capital markets generally
contribute to the common good, so that economic and regulatory policies promoting these
outcomes also operate in the public interest. Private profit and public gain are not, and do
not have to be, mutually exclusive. Policies aimed at preserving financial stability, taken
to the extreme, may stifle beneficial innovations and even result in long-term economic
stagnation.
Given this inherent indeterminacy, it may be that the best we can do is to cast the
285. Again, the fact that the Council members would be mostly academics and public leaders, who are
typically skilled public speakers used to "performing" in front of an audience, and who can explain complex
concepts in relatively simple terms, should help the Council to master the art of using media to educate and
organize ordinary citizens.
286. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 59.
287. See supra Part I.B.
288. Thus, according to one commentator, "the process of regulating in pursuit of public interest objectives
faces two fundamental problems: the elusiveness of the concept at the theoretical level, and its (consequent)
fragility as the basis for practical regulation." Mike Feintuck, Regulatory Rationales, Beyond the Economic: In
Search of the Public Interest, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 39, 45 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds.,
2010).
289. Id at 46 ("[P]rinciples relating to regulation in pursuit of collective objectives are consistently much
less clearly elaborated and less developed than those relating to private interests.").
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concept of public interest in financial stability as a form of precautionary approach to
avoiding excessive risks to society's economic and social welfare that private actors'
profit seeking activities potentially pose, rather than any substantive notion of the
common good.2 90 The problem, of course, is balancing potential harms and benefits-
both private and public-of any specific financial activity or regulatory policy.29 1 The
precautionary approach would consciously tip the balance in favor of avoiding potential
harm to the public, even where such harm may not be readily quantifiable or certain to
happen. Nevertheless, articulating the underlying principles for conducting this delicate
balancing act in individual situations is a difficult task that is beyond the scope of this
Article. Ultimately, it is a political, and contestable, act.292
Yet, acknowledging these conceptual difficulties hardly obviates one simple truth:
where there is public money, there is also public interest. When taxpayers are forced to
pay for the failure of private financial markets, taxpayers have a clear interest in making
those markets less likely to fail again. Unfortunately, the ideological and intellectual
dominance of the economic approaches to public policy and law in recent decades
effectively foreclosed any serious scholarly debate about the broader democratic,
communitarian, or republican aspects of financial sector regulation. Perhaps outlining the
contours of a tripartite regulatory structure, incomplete as it is, would help to start that
important debate.293
290. This concept of precaution, however, is broader than the so-called "precautionary principle"
frequently invoked in the context of environmental protection as a method of decision-making under conditions
of uncertainty. See Noah Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle From Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1285 (2011) (examining the role of precautionary principle in risk regulation). Despite variations in its
formulation, the precautionary principle generally holds that if a particular action may potentially cause
substantial public harm, even though there is no clear scientific evidence that such harm would occur, the
burden of establishing that taking such action would not cause the harm feared should fall on the party that
proposes it. Id. at 1295. The precautionary principle is based on the notion of social responsibility to protect the
public from potential harm, whenever scientific (or other form of objective) investigation uncovered plausible
risk. Id. For a discussion of the origins and the renewed significance of the precautionary principle in the
context of rapid technological progress, see Roberto Andomo, The Precautionary Principle: A New Legal
Standard for a New Technological Age, 1 J.I.B.L. 11 (2004).
291. Not surprisingly, the efficacy and normative underpinnings of the precautionary principle continue to
be at the center of intense academic debate. Scholars have long criticized precautionary principle for ignoring
various risk trade-offs and even increasing the overall level of risk in the system. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS
OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary
Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003); JAMES K. HAMMIT & PETER SAND ET AL., THE REALITY OF
PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B. Weiner et al.
eds., 2011). It is not this Article's intent, however, to stake a claim in this broader debate on the pros and cons
of the precautionary principle.
292. See Feintuck, supra note 288, at 57 (stating that unpacking the concept of "public interest" exposes "a
set of core values which are essentially political and contestable but which are embedded in legal discourse").
293. Some critics may find the idea of creating a body of designated public interest "guardians" inherently
elitist and, therefore, anti-democratic. Moreover, a proposal to entrust such guardianship function to academics
pushes directly against the strong tradition of anti-intellectualism in American history. However, these
ideological debates, despite their divisive potential, may themselves be viewed as an integral part of the process
of refining our concept of democracy in the increasingly complex modem world. By sparking controversy, the
proposal advanced in this Article may help to move that positive process forward and, ultimately, enrich our
democratic experience.
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2. Effectiveness and Accountability
The proposed model of the Public Interest Council aims to resolve the fundamental
tension between technical expertise and democratic accountability. 294 However, it may
not be able to achieve that ever-elusive balance in practice. For instance, even trying to
"pack" the Council with academics and other people with knowledge of financial markets
and regulation does not guarantee that they would, in fact, possess the necessary level of
sophistication in understanding complex systemic risk dynamics. In addition, the
members of the Council may disagree on substantive issues or have different approaches
to setting the Council's priorities. Many highly knowledgeable and well-established
experts, selected to serve on the Council, may genuinely oppose the concept of more
proactive regulation of financial markets on theoretical grounds. All of these factors may
significantly limit the Council's effectiveness.
Another problem is the possibility of individual members of the Council being
"captured" by the financial industry. Statutory provisions aimed at ensuring the Council's
independence from the industry, described above, do not guarantee such independence in
practice. Capture is a pervasive and insidious phenomenon that can take many forms. 295
The financial industry's massive and well-paid lobbying machine is particularly skilled at
controlling the regulatory and political debate. Members of the Council may be just as
susceptible to this type of undue influence as the regulators. 296 The ever-present threat of
capture highlights the importance of ensuring public accountability of the Council, which
is likely to pose one of the key regulatory design challenges.
It can be argued that, ultimately, the Council's effectiveness would depend greatly
on personal qualities and character of its individual members, including their superior
sense of moral and professional integrity. It is impossible to ensure the presence of such
qualities through regulatory design alone.29 7 Drafting the statutory selection criteria so as
to increase the chances of appointing only the candidates with a strong personal
commitment to defending the public interest against the financial industry's self-
interested behavior would be a very delicate legal exercise. 298 Yet, this may not be an
insurmountable obstacle. As Ayres and Braithwaite note, "there exist individuals who for
all practical purposes are incorruptible and immune to all available forms of capture.
Individuals of this sort are particularly likely to be found among PIG activists. What
294. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and
Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 555,
556 (2011) ("Ultimately, the regulatory state raises several fundamental tensions, between technocratic
expertise and democratic accountability and between insulated policymaking and democratic participation.").
295. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
296. This danger of industry capture is particularly heightened because, in order to do its job effectively,
the Council would have to have extensive contacts with, and secure collaboration of, private financial
institutions and their individual representatives.
297. In fact, the same problem persists with respect to any regulatory agency's ability to act in the public
interest. Even though an individual agency's statutory mission may remain the same, the rigor with which such
agency discharges its oversight duties and pursues publicly minded policies often differs significantly over time,
depending on the ideological, political, and personal views and preferences of its key officers and decision-
makers. Alan Greenspan's influence on the Federal Reserve's policies and institutional culture provides a
classic example of this phenomenon.
298. The statutory provisions cannot explicitly condition appointment of any individual as a member of the
Council on such individual's ideological or political views.
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company would be foolish enough to consider offering Ralph Nader a bribe?" 299
Finally, there is a potential concern that even a well-appointed and independent
Council may fail to establish itself as an equal partner in the regulatory process. Once
again, regulatory design is of limited value in trying to ensure the political relevance of
this new body. It is possible that the regulatory apparatus would successfully marginalize
the Council and relegate it to playing a largely ceremonial role. Such marginalization
could also enable the captured regulators to use the Council's acquiescence to legitimize
their actions and deflect public criticisms.
On the other hand, even if the Council is less effective in practice than originally
intended, its very existence may serve to strengthen the regulatory framework by altering
the legal and regulatory landscape. Thus, the simple fact of knowing that they may be
called to explain and defend their practices in front of the Council would alter the
incentives of both the regulators and the firms and force them to pay greater attention to
their actions. 300 In addition, the existence of the Council may empower the publicly
minded regulators to pursue more assertive substantive regulatory policies by giving
them "cover" from the industry's pressure.
3. Political Feasibility and Potential Alternatives
The most obvious challenge on the path to tripartism in financial regulation is its
political feasibility. Given the current political dynamics, it seems unlikely that Congress
would pass any reforms along the lines proposed here in the foreseeable future. The
substantive limitations of the Dodd-Frank Act show the absence of real political will to
go beyond partial measures. That fact should not, however, preclude the search for more
comprehensive and innovative regulatory solutions to the problem of systemic risk
containment. 30 1 Nevertheless, it is important to consider some of the less radical and
potentially more feasible alternative methods of ensuring a more effective direct
representation of the public interest in systemic risk regulation.30 2
299. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 80, at 73.
300. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (arguing that pressure from public interest groups is an important
factor facilitating the emergence of more socially responsible forms of industry self-regulation).
301. In the words of one commentator, "if what is politically feasible is only Dodd-Frank, then perhaps
our attention needs to focus most immediately on changing our politics and thereby expanding the domain of
the politically feasible." David A. Dana, A Simple Approach to Preventing The Next Housing Crisis-Why We
Need One, What One Would Look Like, and Why Dodd-Frank Isn't It, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 722 (2011).
302. One such potential alternative could be enhancing the ability of the public interest groups and citizens
to enforce existing laws and regulations by bringing lawsuits against the financial institutions and regulatory
agencies. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 61. The general limitations of using "private attorneys-general" to
police financial firms' and regulators' behavior are discussed above. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying
text. The principal problem with this alternative is that private litigation is a fundamentally ex post, or "back-
end" right to challenge the results of wrongful conduct. It does not function as an effective mechanism of ex
ante regulatory intervention, which is the key to effective prevention of systemic crises. See, e.g., Bamberger,
supra note 20, at 678 ("At the same time, the public interest in mitigating risk ex ante, rather than after harm has
occurred, is clear."). The outcomes of litigation are not guaranteed and depend on the facts and circumstances of
individual cases, as well as on the applicable standards of judicial review and other procedural factors. Not all
court cases receive wide publicity or have broader legal or political implications. In short, while the threat of
litigation brought by the private attomeys-general may shape incentives of the financial market participants and
regulators, it's unlikely to provide an effective method of systemic risk regulation. For this reason, expanded
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It is possible to argue that the proposed model of tripartism may be easier to
implement on a more limited scale. For instance, the newly created FSOC may establish,
by regulatory action, an independent council of experts to advise the FSOC on issues of
systemic risk regulation. This arrangement would remove some of the thorniest legal and
practical issues the Public Interest Council proposal raises. Importantly, Congress would
not need to get involved. There is well-established precedent for federal agencies setting
up such advisory councils, subject to certain statutory requirements, 303 and financial
regulators have a long-standing practice of working with similar advisory bodies. 3 04 The
FSOC would select the members of the council, in accordance with its own criteria, thus
obviating the need for complicated legislative drafting of selection criteria and other
provisions. Because the FSOC would retain all decision-making power, the council's
tasks would be relatively clearly defined and less controversial than the inevitably broad
charge of the proposed Public Interest Council. In essence, the FSOC's new advisory
body would function as a kind of a "regulatory contrarian," envisioned by McDonnell
and Schwarcz, 305 whose main role would be to help the FSOC identify potential sources
of systemic risk by providing an independent outside perspective.
However, this solution also has significant potential drawbacks, largely common to
all regulatory contrarians housed inside or attached to regulatory agencies. Because the
FSOC would retain full control over the selection of the council members and the actual
decision-making, it would be much easier for the new advisory body to be "captured" by
the industry or marginalized by the regulator. 306 Without an independent status and
ability to reach outside the FSOC, the advisory council is not likely to be in a position to
shape regulatory outcomes in a meaningful way, especially where the council's views on
specific issues in systemic risk regulation differ from the views of the FSOC members.
A potentially more fruitful form of tripartism on a limited scale could emerge, for
example, in a regulatory regime where complex financial products were subject to
mandatory government approval.30 7 Under such a regime, the regulatory agency
use of "private attorneys-general" is not discussed here.
303. Importantly, an agency setting up such an advisory body must comply with the requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). See Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat.
770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2). Among other things, the FACA requires that an advisory council
includes representatives of the broad spectrum of interests involved and that its meetings are open to the public.
Id.
304. The Federal Reserve's Consumer Advisory Council, discussed above, is one well-known example of
such an advisory body. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. On June 3, 2011, the FDIC announced the
creation of a new Advisory Committee on Systemic Resolutions, to advise the agency on a wide range of issues
in connection with resolution of systemically important financial institutions. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board
Creates Advisory Committee on Systemic Resolutions (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/20I /prl 1099.html. The new Committee has 18 members, including academics and public figures,
such as Paul Volcker. Id.
305. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
306. To satisfy the FACA requirement of a balanced representation of views on an advisory council, this
new body is likely to include a fair number of industry representatives or experts with pro-industry views,
which would significantly undermine its potential to act as a counterweight to the financial industry's agenda-
setting power.
307. For a theoretical discussion of product approval as a regulatory model, see, e.g., Daniel Carpenter &
Michael M. Ting, A Theory of Approval Regulation (Feb. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). For recent proposals to introduce some form of a mandatory financial product approval scheme, see
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administering the product approval scheme could establish an advisory council similar to
the Council proposed here, but with a more specific charge to represent the independent
public interest-oriented perspective in the process of licensing individual financial
products.3 08 This advisory body would function much like the FDA's scientific expert
councils, which could provide a model for working out the details of the system. 309
Of course, instituting a financial product approval scheme is itself a major
regulatory reform that is currently not on the legislators' agenda. Debating the pros and
cons of such a reform is outside the scope of this Article. 3 10 Rather, it is used as an
example of a fundamental shift in the regulatory philosophy, which could create the basis
for a potentially more concrete and viable form of tripartism. In the absence of political
will to enact truly fundamental regulatory reforms in the financial services sector, the
prospects for creating a successful model of regulatory tripartism, even on a limited scale,
are likely to remain remote.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article advocates the statutory creation of a new form of tripartite regulatory
regime aimed at the detection and prevention of systemic risk in the financial sector.
Although it leaves many significant details blank and many important questions
unanswered, this Article offers a radically new vision of the financial services regulation
as a process involving three equal participants: bankers, bureaucrats, and guardians of the
public interest. Admittedly, this vision is not likely to become reality in the near future.
Nor is it meant as a comprehensive plan to solve the problem of effective systemic risk
regulation in the financial sector. The main purpose of this Article is to expand the scope
of the ongoing policy discussions beyond purely technocratic solutions and to encourage
the debate on the future of the publicly minded financial services regulation.
Daniel Carpenter, Particulars of Financial Product Safety Commission, THE TOBIN PROJECT: CONSIDERING A
FINANCIAL PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 8 (May 2009), available at
http://people.hmdc.harvard.eduldcarpent/finreg/FPSC-Tobin.pdf (proposing the creation of a Financial
Product Safety Commission with ex ante approval powers over financial products); Saule T. Omarova, License
To Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
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308. For a similar idea in the context of consumer financial product safety scheme, see Daniel Carpenter,
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309. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
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